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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis aims to respond to the following question: How does the depiction of              
terrorists in popular fiction novels compare to the explanations in academia as to why              
individuals become terrorists and join terrorist organizations? Is this fictional depiction a            
reflection or distortion of reality, and what insights can we take away from this              
comparison? The argument of this thesis is that fiction’s depiction of terrorists is both a               
reflection and distortion of reality, as it presents a unique creative, emotionally resonant             
narrative that humanizes the terrorists. By giving a voice to their motivations and             
experiences, readers are able to empathize, relate to, and engage with these terrorists             
characters as rational, emotional human beings instead of vicious monsters or killing            
machines. To support this argument, this thesis (a) outlines the conventional wisdoms            
that pervade the current, popular narrative of terrorism discourse, (b) discusses the            
academic theories and explanations that challenge these conventional wisdoms, and (c)           
analyzes five contemporary fiction novels on terrorism, focusing on whether their           
characterizations of terrorists play into the conventional wisdoms or diverge from them            
and present a more nuanced, complex depiction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
What fascinates me most about fiction is how it is able to take ideas, questions, 
and values that exist in the real world and present them in a creative way. As an 
International Relations and Literature dual major at Claremont McKenna College, I find 
the relationship between politics, history and fiction to be particularly striking. My 
favorite genre of fiction to read is war literature because it conveyed the dimensions of 
war that one cannot grasp from reading academic theory or following the news. With 
terrorism being one of the most prominent issues on the international stage today, I 
wondered why this prominence did not transfer over to the literary sphere—or if it did, 
why there has not been much attention paid to terrorism’s literary depictions. My thesis 
focuses on responding to the following question: How does the depiction of terrorists in 
popular fiction novels compare to the explanations in academia as to why individuals 
become terrorists and join terrorist organizations? Is this fictional depiction a reflection or 
distortion of reality, and what insights can we take away from this comparison?  
 If the purpose of fiction is to tell a compelling, emotionally charged story in a 
creative way rather than to identify patterns that exist in the real world and analyze them 
using true experiences and facts, then one may expect the depiction of terrorists in novels 
to be less nuanced and complex than academic explanations. If novels focus more on 
action and emotion as the key elements that drive plot rather than the justifications for 
why the characters operate in the way they do, then one can predict that the novels will 
fall short of the varying characterizations presented in academic theory, and ultimately 
contribute in reaffirming the distorted, one-dimensional popular narrative. However, to 
my surprise and delight, I have found that the novels I have read and analyzed do the 
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opposite of what I hypothesized. Fiction, instead of being a total distortion of reality, both 
reflects and reforms what is presented to us in academic theory. But what it does that 
academic explanations do not is to humanize the terrorists by giving a voice to their 
thoughts, experiences, and justifications for their actions. Fiction allows the readers not 
just to learn about the terrorist, but to understand them as rational, emotional, individual 
human beings instead of horrifying monsters or killing machines.  
 In terms of structure, I first outline the conventional wisdoms and common 
misperceptions and the arguments that challenge them within academia. Then, I move on 
to explain my methodology and how I chose the five novels I will be evaluating in this 
thesis. In the subsequent chapters, I present my analysis for each of the novels, looking at 
which conventional wisdoms they each address and whether or not they challenge these 
misperceptions and offer up a different angle or more complex depiction. Finally, I end 
with exploring how each novel points to what I call the Intention-Perception Cycle, 
which refers to the reciprocal relationship between the public’s perception of terrorism 
and the true intentions of the terrorist and how the perceptions of one side affect the 
actions of the other and vice versa.  
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CHAPTER 1: THEORY 
As Joao Ricardo and Daniel G. Arce M. highlight in “Terror Support and 
Recruitment,” it is the people—the militants and terrorists themselves—that are the main 
resource of any terrorist organization.1 Therefore, designing effective counter-terrorist 
policies should not solely prioritize taking back territory, targeting intelligence assets, or 
destroying weapons facilities. Rather, counterterrorism should place understanding “the 
determinants of terrorist recruitment and militancy” as one of its top priorities, because 
preventive measures will be more effective in the long-run than countermeasures.2 Bruce 
Hoffman states that the main challenge analysts must overcome is to both identify and 
understand the “inner logic” that drives terrorism and rationalizes terrorists’ motives.3 
Hoffman comments that “it is easier to dismiss terrorists as irrational homicidal maniacs 
than to comprehend the depth of their frustration, the core of their aims and motivations, 
and to appreciate how these considerations affect their choice of tactics and targets.”4 
Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter echo Hoffman’s sentiment in their paper “The 
Strategies of Terrorism,” highlighting that the press and media have inaccurately 
represented terrorists, portraying them as “crazy extremists who commit indiscriminate 
acts of violence, without any larger goal beyond revenge or desire to produce fear in an 
enemy population.”5  
                                               
1 Faria, Joao Ricardo Faria and Daniel G. Acre M. “Terror Support and Recruitment.” Defense and Peace 
Economics, 16:4 (August 21 2006). <https://doi.org/10.1080/1024269052000344855>. 263. 
2 Faria and Arce M, “Terror Support and Recruitment,” 263. 
3 Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11.” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 25:5, (January 7 2011). <https://doi.org/10.1080/105761002901223>. 313. 
4 Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” 313. 
5 Kydd, Andrew H. and Barbara F. Walter. “The Strategies of Terrorism.” International Security, Volume 
31, Number 1, (Summer 2006), The MIT Press. <http://muse.jhu.edu/article/201248>. 52. 
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It is only logical to assume that if the press and media represent terrorism in this 
generalized, one-dimensional, distorted manner, then there is a high chance that this 
representation pervades the literary sphere as well.  
However, even though fiction, by definition, is not an authentic depiction of 
reality, because characterization is an integral and central element of fiction, many novels 
depict terrorism from a more sympathetic, personal, and emotional lens compared to 
academia’s more scientific, systemic, and analytical approach. Indeed, the focus of 
novels will be on personal motivations, values and beliefs relating to identity, nationalism 
and individual experience. The argument presented here is that fiction has the potential to 
render the discussions, issues, and values of our society with regard to terrorism from an 
important and insightful perspective. This can complement the academic discussions of 
terrorism and counteract the often one-dimensional media coverage of terrorist actions, 
bringing the reader into the mind and motivation of terrorists in ways that can, at least, 
build understanding and may even develop empathy.  
 It seems then that academics and novelists have a common goal: to reject the flat, 
one-dimensional perceptions of who terrorists are and what terrorism is by teasing out the 
layers of complexity. In his paper discussing the development of “terrorism discourse,” 
Richard Jackson asserts that “discourses are never completely uniform, coherent or 
consistent; they have porous borders and there are often exceptions, inconsistencies and 
contradictions by different speakers and texts.”6 On one hand, academics will engage in 
debates and discussions about the “terrorist profile,” presenting evidence to either support 
                                               
6 Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse.” 
Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2007): 394-426. Blackwell Publishing. 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x>. 402.  
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or undermine the conventional wisdoms surrounding the characteristics terrorists possess. 
Academics evaluate studies and cite specific individuals and examples. On the other 
hand, novelists do away with the facts and the figures and approach these discussions 
with a more artistic, emotional rendering.  
While academia aims to find patterns and trends that point to which types of 
people under what type of conditions become terrorists, fiction focuses on a personal, 
individual narrative that tells one specific variation of this journey. Because academia 
and fiction operate in different realms and are subject to different frameworks and 
parameters, perhaps fiction can offer a “more flexible and ethically responsible 
alternative to the oppressive confines” of the current terrorism discourse.7 While it is true 
that fiction may reflect and reinforce common stereotypes and misinformation about 
terrorism, fiction is also able to humanize terrorists by pushing readers to open their 
minds and think about the conditions and logic that lead one to terrorism. I chose to 
compare IR theory on terrorism to contemporary fiction on terrorism because I wanted to 
evaluate the literary depiction of political events, systems and ideas. I wanted to see 
whether fiction would offer, if not a more sympathetic, at least a more humanizing, 
explanatory characterization of terrorists.  
 
MISCONCEPTIONS 
Before delving into the novels themselves, it is important to first examine the 
academic theories behind why and how individuals become terrorists. These theories tend 
to focus on the conditions that may contribute to terrorism and how those conditions 
                                               
7 Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’,” 426. 
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influence both the logic of terrorism and individuals’ openness to recruitment (these are 
interrelated). The theories are often introduced as corrections of the problematic 
conventional wisdom that has sprung up about what leads people to become terrorists. 
This is significant because these false understandings continue to inform counterterrorism 
policy; analysts would like to debunk these myths and provide policymakers with a 
firmer footing. In their paper “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” 
Jacob Shapiro and C. Christine Fair address what they call “conventional wisdoms,” 
which refers to the motivations that have been ascribed to  individuals who join 
extremist/terrorist organizations. Although Shapiro’s and Fair’s  work specifically relates 
to Pakistan, the problematic assumptions apply to terrorists in general and influence U.S. 
policy prescriptions for anti-terrorist initiatives. They include:  
1. Poverty is a root cause of support for militancy, or at least that poorer and less-
educated individuals are more prone to militants’ appeals.8 
2. Personal religiosity and support for sharia (Islamic law) are strongly correlated 
with support for Islamist militancy.9 
3. Support for political goals espoused by legal Islamist parties predicts support for 
militant organizations.10 
4. Those who support democracy—either in terms of supporting democratic 
processes such as voting or in terms of valuing core democratic principles—
oppose Islamism and militancy.11   
 
As Shapiro and Fair mention, while these assumptions dominate the discourse in media 
and in U.S. Congress, they have no “firm evidentiary basis.” 12  Thus, terrorism experts in 
                                               
8 Shapiro, Jacob N. and C. Christine Fair. “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan.” 
International Security, Volume 34, Number 3, Winter 2009/10. <http://muse.jhu.edu/article/369949>. 80. 
9 Shapiro and Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” 81.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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academia have been engaging in an ongoing conversation to qualify and challenge, 
disprove, and debunk these false understandings.  
  
II CHALLENGING FALSE ASSUMPTIONS 
Poverty leads individuals to become terrorists 
The belief that poverty is a root cause of terrorism is one of the most prominent 
conventional wisdoms in terrorism discourse. This conventional wisdom is based on the 
belief that, when one has nothing to lose, one is more likely to resort to self-destructive 
activities.13  In terms of the idea of poverty as a reason to support terrorism or militancy, 
Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova argue that individuals turn to terrorism in response to 
the political conditions of their society as well as feelings of indignity and frustration, 
stating that “any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, 
complicated and probably quite weak.”14 They explain that this conventional wisdom is a 
derivative of the belief that poverty and lack of education are connected to illegal 
activity. But this assumption is only true with regards to property crimes; there is no 
relationship between the economic status and economic opportunity of the criminal and 
the occurrence of violent crimes.15 
Martha Crenshaw supports Krueger and Maleckova and states that, in fact, a 
significant amount of terrorists are “young, well-educated, and middle class in 
                                               
13 Claude Berrebi. “Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among 
Palestinians.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, RAND Corporation. Vol. 13, Issue 1 
(2007). <http://public-
policy.huji.ac.il/.upload/segel/ClaudeBerrebi/EvidenceAbouttheLinkBetweenEducation.pdf>.1.  
14 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova. “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal 
Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 17, No. 4 (Fall 2003). 
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/3216934>. 119.  
15 Krueger and Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” 121. 
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background,” and that those who are terrorists include students, professionals, and even 
individuals with prior political experience.16 Though this conventional wisdom is one of 
the most dominant in terrorism discourse, there is a plethora of examples that 
demonstrate otherwise. For instance, the hijackers who committed the attacks of 9/11 
were not “mentally unstable, economically bereft, or abject, isolated loners.”17 In fact, 
these suicide terrorists had “relatively high levels of education, socioeconomic status, and 
stable family ties.”18 In one study on Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), it was 
found that only 16% of terrorists were characterized as poor, compared to the 33% of the 
Palestinian population.19 In addition, out of the 208 terrorists whose education attainment 
was identified, 96% had at least a high school education, 65% had some kind of higher 
education, compared to 51% and 15% respectively in the Palestinian population of the 
same age, sex, and religion.20 On the other side of the argument, one study shows that for 
Hezbollah, “poverty is inversely related with the likelihood that someone becomes a 
Hezbollah fighter, and educated is positively related.”21 
 Mia Bloom takes this argument a different direction and explains that a terrorist 
organization will target different types of people based on its staffing needs.22 When 
terrorists need to fill the ranks and up their numbers, they may turn to “low hanging fruit” 
                                               
16 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981), Ph.D. 
Programs in Political Science, City University of New York. <http://jstor.org/stable/421717>. 384. 
17 Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” 305. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Berrebi, “Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians,” 17. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Krueger and Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” 133. 
22 Mia Bloom. “Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment and “Talent Spotting” in the PIRA, Al 
Qaeda, and ISIS.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40:7 (Oct 25 2016). 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237219>.604. 
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who are considered to be uneducated and underachieving.23 However, the larger and 
more successful the organization becomes, recruitment is geared towards bringing in 
“educated and professional individuals with specific expertise to adapt to changing 
opportunities and increased pressures from a securitized environment.24 Krueger and 
Maleckova postulate that, in the eyes of the talent spotters, a high level of education is 
indicative of the individual’s commitment to the cause as well as their competence and 
ability to prepare for a task and carry it out.25 For example, the Provisional-Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) would recruit potential members from college campuses to 
target individuals with advanced education degrees, specifically in Mathematics, 
Chemistry or Engineering.26 In short, there are times when recruiting is manpower-
focused, and there are times when it will be expertise-focused.27 
 But even if poverty is not a direct cause of terrorism, academics are diligent in 
exploring how it may indirectly lead someone to the path of terrorism. Krueger and 
Maleckova mention the “Robin Hood model of terrorism,” or the idea that economically 
well-off elite who live in poor countries could be inspired by the poverty of their 
countrymen, making them want to (literally) fight for economic equality.28 In terms of 
education, while individuals with “improved reasoning skills” will be able to better 
understand the moral and religious justifications put forth by terrorist organizations, it 
can also be argued that education makes individuals recognize that there are other 
                                               
23 Bloom, “Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment and “Talent Spotting”,” 604.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Krueger and Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” 122. 
26 Bloom, “Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment and “Talent Spotting”” 609.  
27 Ibid., 604.  
28 Krueger and Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” 137. 
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alternatives to violence—protests, strikes, appeals to media, dialogue with political 
representatives—as a means to achieve a political goal.29   
 
There is a correlation between religiosity and violence 
The conventional wisdom that religiosity is strongly correlated with the support of 
terrorism has been generalized to the point where there is a belief that if someone is 
Muslim, they are more likely to become a terrorist, which could not be further from the 
truth. This misperception is derived from the assumption that violence is inherent to 
Islam, as Islam “makes no distinction between Church and State, has never discarded the 
notion of religious war, purports to regulate both the public and private lives of Muslims 
and has much to say about the political life of the community.”30 Yes, there are terrorist 
organizations that capitalize on the ideology behind Islam to recruit members. For 
example, ISIS propaganda emphasizes “the individual religious obligation to come and 
join its ranks, as part of the duty of hijra and jihad.”31 However, it is incorrect to then 
assume that Islam—and thus individuals of Muslim faith—advocates and encourages 
violence and acts of terror.  
To illustrate the complexity of the relationship between religiosity and violence, 
Daniel Byman examines the role of religion in Salafi-jihadist insurgencies to answer the 
question, “How Much Does Religion Really Matter?” Salafi-jihadist insurgencies are 
groups whose ideologies are “affiliated with, allied to, or sympathize with Al Qaeda, such 
as Al Qaeda of Iraq (AQI), Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the 
                                               
29 Berrebi, “Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians,” 8. 
30 Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’,” 403. 
31 Bloom, “Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment and “Talent Spotting”,” 616. 
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Taliban.32 Salafi-jihadist insurgencies all uphold the goal of “establishing an Islamic 
state, overturning supposedly apostate governments, and driving the United States, other 
Western powers, and their local non-Salafi allies out of their country or region.”33 In 
other words, the religious beliefs of these groups do inform their ultimate goal. These 
groups are opposed to democracy and nationalism, and they emphasize “rejection of any 
deviation from what they perceive as the oneness of God and display hostility to non-
Muslims.”34 Much of the recruiting for these insurgencies occurs via religious networks 
and organizations, of which mosques and religious social organizations play an integral 
role in influencing people to join the greater movement and allowing talent spotters 
spaces for them to seek out potential recruits.35 Furthermore, the Salafi-jihadist ideology 
glorifies martyrdom which, coupled with the ability to attract foreign fighters, allows 
these groups to “attract suicide bombers and sustain their terror campaigns.”36 
However, although Salafi-jihadist insurgencies utilize jihad and the tenets of 
Islam to ground their mission, expand their power, and build their organization, Byman 
highlights that these groups have a limited appeal: while their ideology strikes cultural 
chords and symbols that draw in select supporters, it exclusionary terms alienate the 
larger demographics.37 In its rejection of nationalism, it excludes many of the anti-
government opposition that holds nationalistic positions, and in its rejection of 
democracy, it excludes mainstream Islamists who are in favor of democratic processes 
                                               
32 Daniel Byman. “Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies: How Much Does Religion Really Matter?”Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism, 36:5, (April 18 2013), Taylor and Francis Group, LLC. 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.775417>. 354. 
33 Daniel Byman, “Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies,” 356. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 358. 
36 Daniel Byman, “Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies,” 360. 
37 Ibid., 361. 
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over the tyrannical regimes they are under.38 What Byman’s case study shows is that 
there is a distinction between religiosity and religious extremism. Although there are 
terrorists who are religious extremists, (a) not all terrorists are religious extremists, and 
(b) not all religious individuals are more likely to become terrorists. As another example, 
in one study based on attitude surveys carried out in Algeria and Jordan in mid-2002, 
neither the Algerian or Jordanian respondents with higher levels of religious involvement 
are more likely to approve of terrorist acts against U.S. targets.39 The factors that do lead 
someone to be more likely to approve of terrorism against U.S. targets are “less 
confidence in domestic political institutions” and “stronger disapproval of American 
foreign policy.”40 
David Lake, in “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-
first Century,” breaks down extremism into two key attributes. The first is that the beliefs 
of extremists, be they political, religious, or other, “are not widely shared even within 
their own societies.”41 The second is that extremists, at least initially, lack the means or 
power to achieve their objectives.42 Because the number of people who hold extremist 
viewpoints is so small, their ideologies have to be built out and grounded on existing 
sentiments and values so that they can gain both legitimacy and support. In their paper 
regarding the radicalization of homegrown terrorists, Alex Wilner and Claire-Jehanne 
Dubouloz state that “Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other leaders of transnational 
                                               
38 Ibid., 361. 
39 Mark Tessler and Michael D.H. Robbins. “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to 
Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 
2007). 319. 
40 Tessler and Robbins, “What Leads Some to Approve of Terrorist Acts?” 323. 
41 David A. Lake, “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century.” 
International Organization. (Spring 2002), pp. 15 - 29. The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S777777770200002X>. 18. 
42 Lake, “Rational Extremism,” 18. 
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organizations are careful to present solid religious interpretations that speak to religious 
doctrine and engage current debates when justifying their violent actions.”43 However, 
this does not make Islam violent and terroristic by nature, though the perceived 
correlation between religiosity and violence—what Jackson refers to as the “terrorism-
extremism” association—leads people to interpret it as such.44  
If there is a terrorist profile, it more closely resembles a politically conscious 
individual who partakes in a grassroots movement than a religious fanatic.45 
 
Terrorists are mentally ill 
Often within the conversation of religious fanaticism is also the conversation of 
mental instability. In “Terrorism and Mental Illness: Is There a Relationship?”, David 
Weatherson and Jonathan Moran state that the “image of the psychopathic terrorist 
persists in the mass media and to varied extents within academic and policy circles.”46 
However, research from extensive field interviews finds that “pathological 
characterizations of those who participate in militant and/or terrorist groups are 
inconsistent with empirical realities.47 In fact, “militant activists and those who commit or 
support acts of terrorism tend not to be psychologically abnormal, disturbed, or desperate 
individuals as they are depicted popularly.”48 Organizations often reject potential recruits 
                                               
43 Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz. “Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: an 
interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization.” Global Change, Peace & Security. 22:1, 
(February 3 2010). <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956>. 41. 
44 Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’,” 404-405. 
45 Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’,” 417. 
46 David Weatherston and Jonathan Moran. “Terrorism and Mental Illness: Is There a Relationship?” 
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47(6), Sage Publications, 2003. 
<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0306624X03257244>. 707. 
47 Bloom, “Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment,” 614. 
48 Ibid. 
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who openly seek excitement and danger for perverse personal intentions because they see 
these recruits as high security risks.49 This goes for terrorists who perform all kinds of 
duties, even those who are trained for and commit suicide missions. For example, 
“organizational features of the PIRA signify the members are not psychopaths, because 
the members display attitudes of dedication, cooperation and loyalty.”50 Terrorists willing 
to kill themselves in the process of committing violence is not indicative of a mental 
disorder. Rather, this internalization and acceptance of performing a task of the highest 
risk reflects the solidity and depth of their radicalized logic and belief in their goals, 
which is completely different from being mentally unstable.  
In their study, “A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism,” 
Emily Corner and Paul Gill outline the development on the academic discussion about 
the relationship between terrorism and mental illness. According to them, studies in the 
1970s emphasized that the compulsion to partake in terrorist activity or join an 
organization (be it voluntarily or through recruitment) is inherent in individuals engaged 
in militancy.51 Moving forward, studies in the 1980s characterized terrorists as “hesitant, 
emotionally damaged youths who are victims of parental rejection that delayed their 
achievement of adult identity,” rather than the “aggressive psychopaths” that they were 
portrayed to be.52 These kinds of conclusions were dismissed in the late 1990s and 2000s, 
                                               
49 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 391. 
50 Weatherston and Moran, “Terrorism and Mental Illness: Is There a Relationship?” 705. 
51 Emily Corner and Paul Gill, “A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism,” Law and 
Human Behavior. Vol. 39, No. 1. American Psychological Association. (2015). 
<http:dx.doi.org/10.1037/1hb0000102>. 23. 
52 Corner and Gill, “A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism,” 23. 
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and according to Corner and Gill, a consensus emerged that terrorist motivation had to do 
more with group dynamics than individual psychology.53  
Weatherson and Moran point out that “when terrorists do exhibit symptoms of 
mental illness this may be as a result of their terrorist activity,” rather than the cause of 
them partaking in it.54 The tasks that come with joining a terrorist organization—
operating in secrecy, committing violent acts, questions the trust and credibility of those 
around you—makes for a highly “hazardous and stressful” environment that can take a 
severe mental toll one one’s psyche.55 And it is in this long-term exposure to the high-
stake environment “and the use of instrumental and expressive violence” that may in turn 
reflect and individual as being a “psychopathic or psychotic reveler in violence.”56 One 
interesting consideration that Corner and Gill investigate is the role of mental illness in 
lone-actor terrorism as compared to its role in group terrorism. Their results find that 
“there is a stronger association between mental illness and lone-actor terrorists than 
mental illness and group-based terrorists.”57 This will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 5.  
The takeaway from this discussion is that, like any of these other factors 
mentioned, there is a mixed bag. In any organization there will be members “who 
succumb, as many nonpathological individuals would, to mental health problems, others 
who remain normal, and others who exhibit pathological tendencies that may explain 
                                               
53 Ibid. 
54 Weatherston and Moran, “Terrorism and Mental Illness: Is There a Relationship?” 702. 
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their involvement in terrorism.”58 Though there are indeed terrorists who have mental 
illnesses or disorders, this should not become an all-encompassing generalization, as this 
perspective is incredibly skewed. Citing mental illness as a blanket justification for the 
actions of terrorists undermines the complexity of the processes of radicalization and 
recruitment. In turn, this clouds our understanding of how these processes function, and 
therefore prevent governments, communities and individuals alike from coming up with 
effective counterrorism and CVE policies.  
 
Support for Islamist Parties Leads to Terrorism 
 To start, Islamist terrorism does not only stem from Islamist parties—it can be 
employed in three different categories: “transnational Islamist terrorism; Islamist 
terrorism associated with national liberation movements; and Islamist domestic 
insurgencies against incumbent regimes.”59 But the most important thing to note is that 
majority of Islamist movements are non-violent: although some of these movements do 
have terrorist wings, the terrorist movements comprise a small minority.60 For example, 
Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers were established in 1978, when the Tamil United Liberation 
Front, known as their sister political party, was the single largest opposition party in 
parliament.61 Though they might have sprung from a legitimate Islamist party, the two 
groups are still “sisters,” and thus separate entities of each other. Much like the 
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counterarguments for the conventional wisdom on religiosity, not all those who support 
legitimate Islamist Parties support the use of terrorism.  
Even with this distinction between majority non-violent Islamist movements and 
minority terrorist organizations, there are also cases were groups can fall under both 
categories. Hezbollah, for example, has participated in Lebanon’s national elections as a 
political party since 1992, which contributed to “its transformation from a radical militia 
to a mainstream political party, one of its many roles.”62 Another example is Hamas, 
which was comprised of a “more activist generation of leaders” who emerged from the 
Muslim Brotherhood in 1988, as they “opposed the Brotherhood twin policy of avoiding 
confrontation with Israel and gradual Islamization.”63 Thus, the birth of Hamas did not 
stem from political participation, but rather a moment of “civil unrest” and “popular 
revolt” when the Palestinian Infidada “provided the impetus for its creation.”64 Unlike 
Hezbollah, Hamas was not incubated or supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, but rather 
deviated from them and disagreed with their ideology. While Hamas declined to 
participate in the first legislative and presidential elections in Palestine in January 1996, 
the National Islamic Salvation Party, which was supported by Hamas in its formation, 
did.65 
In contrast to terrorist organizations that sprouted from larger political 
movements, there are also Islamist parties that have exclusively pursued non-violent 
alternatives for affecting change and achieving their objectives are The Muslim 
Brotherhood of Jordan and the Islamist movement in Tunisia. The Muslim Brotherhood 
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of Jordan, who has held legal status since 1945, supported the Hashemite monarchy 
against Arab nationalism and the appeal of radical Islamism, playing a role in the 
democratization of Jordanian politics and established the Islamic Action Front Party 
(IAFP) in 1992.66 The Islamist movement in Tunisia, though victim to institutional 
exclusion and repression, stuck to its commitment to legalism, pluralism and 
incrementalism, championing “accommodation and retreat” instead of rebellion.67 What 
these two examples illustrate is that one’s support of terrorism and indiscriminate 
violence has nothing to do with one’s alignment to an Islamist party or political 
movement. Even if conventional wisdom is more complicated and less concretely 
disputable than the other misperceptions addressed in this chapter. But, the key takeaway 
from this particular discussion is that this conventional wisdom—though not completely 
false in its underlying assumption—fails to demonstrate the variation and diversity in the 
relationships between terrorist organizations and legitimate Islamist parties.  
 
The absence of democracy breeds terrorism  
 The final conventional wisdom evaluated here zooms out of the political sphere a 
little farther, shifting from political parties to regime types as a whole. The argument that 
the absence of democracy breeds terrorism is another misperception that is endorsed at 
the highest level. President Bush said in a speech in March 2005 that the goal of the 
United States was “to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror” 
in the Middle East, in which “tyranny” and “dictatorship” are one of the main 
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conditions.68 Within this trope, there is this embedded assumption that democratic nations 
are less likely to breed or produce terrorists, which is a dangerous assumption to make. 
According to a U.S. State Department’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report, between 
2000 and 2003, “269 major terrorist incidents around the world occurred in countries 
classified as “free” by Freedom House, 119 occurred in “partly free” countries, and 138 
occurred in “not free” countries.69 These numbers show that the incidence of terrorism in 
a given country is not related to or dictated by the degree of freedom that enjoyed by said 
country’s citizens.70  
 Another element of this conventional wisdom is the idea that “failed states” breed 
terrorists. “Failed states” have been scrutinized as examples of the consequences of an 
absence of democracy, and have reified the assumption that terrorists do not come from 
democratic, first-world, stabilized states. Anna Simons challenges this notion and states 
that international terrorists do not predominantly come from failed states.71 She notes that 
“from disenfranchised populations can come foot soldiers, from alienated populations can 
come terrorists. And these exist in pockets everywhere, including in our own 
backyard.”72 This challenge to the conventional wisdom has been undercut particularly 
by the media, as Western press “tends to report terrorist incidents with a cross-border 
element more completely than homegrown terrorist attacks,” with most of the reports 
“[identifying] the location of an incident, but not the identity of the perpetrator.”73 In the 
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summer of 2016, Omar Seddique Mateen gunned down 49 people at Pulse, a gay 
nightclub in Orlando and pledged allegiance to ISIS before doing so.74 Mateen was not 
from a failed state, nor was he a foreign national; he was a first-generation American of 
Afghan descent, born in Queens to Muslim parents, and he attended public schools in 
Florida.75 In October 2017, Sayfullo Saipov killed eight people and injured 11 by driving 
a pickup truck that plowed down a crowded bike path along the Hudson River in 
Manhattan.76 Saipov was from Uzbekistan, but came to the United States in 2010 via 
green card, which allowed him permanent legal residence.77  
 The absence of democracy is a believable trope because it rests on the greater idea 
that terrorism is a weapon of the weak—particularly the assumption that oppression 
breeds terrorism.  If a regime suppresses its opposition, then terrorism may appear to be a 
logical response, as there is no other way for the opposition to challenge or check the 
regime than through unconventional, violent means.78 Yet, many repressive regimes do 
not face terrorist backlashes. Even in democracies, extremists can deliberately choose to 
reject nonviolent paths to opposition that are at their disposal.79 To highlight that there is 
no relationship—either positive or negative—between regime type and terrorism, one can 
look at the difference between India and China. Once again taking from the State 
Department’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report, from 2000 to 2003 there were 203 
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international terrorist attacks in India, the world’s largest democracy (in terms of 
population), and none reported in China, the world’s largest authoritarian state (again in 
terms of population).80 If this misperception that the absence of democracy breeds 
terrorism were true, then the numbers would have been flipped, with India having less, 
and China more.  
 
III. TRUE MOTIVATIONS: MECHANISMS TO RADICALIZATION 
So, if these conventional wisdoms are not the true motivations behind why people 
support or join terrorist organizations, then what does motivate people to undertake 
terrorist actions? Shapiro and Fair outline that support for terrorist organizations exists 
under the two following conditions: (1) that the group is using violence in support of a 
political objective that the moderate individual agrees with, and (2) that violence makes 
sense as the strategy to accomplish these objectives.81 However, it is important to not 
generalize and assume that all those who support the actions of terrorist organizations 
become terrorists. Crenshaw irons this out by clarifying that terrorism “is neither an 
automatic reaction to conditions nor a purely calculated strategy.”82 Rather, terrorists are 
a minority who have reached the conclusion that terrorism is a rational, reasonable, viable 
means of achieving their political ends.  
Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko break down these motivations into 
several categories. Their classification is shown in the table below:  
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Table 1: Pathways to violence: Mechanisms of political radicalization at the 
individual, group, and mass-public levels83 
Level of radicalization Mechanism 
Individual 1 Personal Victimization 
2 Political Grievance 
3 Joining a radical group: the slippery slope 
4 Joining a radical group: the power of love 
5 Extremity shift in like-minded groups 
Group 6 Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat 
7 Competition for the same base of support 
8 Competition with state power—condensation  
9 Within-group competition—fissioning 
Mass 10 Jujitsu politics 
11 Hate 
12 Martyrdom 
 
McCauley and Moskalenko’s classification shows that there are several mechanisms to 
be tailored to individuals with varying personalities and experiences. Bloom reinforces 
this, stating that “propaganda intended to attract formerly incarcerated gang members is 
significantly different from those messages aimed at recruiting doctors, nurses, and 
engineers.”84 I will delve into these mechanisms in more detail as they come up in the 
novels I am investigating.  But what the mechanisms in the table clearly show is that 
there is no one terrorist personality, and there is no single “terrorist profile.” It is possible 
that those who commit terrorist acts are doing so in response to social conditions and 
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objectives that extend beyond their own personal situation and have little to do with their 
own individual experiences and background.85 It is also true for someone to support 
terrorism not because of “discontent with personal or even societal circumstances but 
rather from perceptions about who or what is responsible for the status quo.”86 Be it to 
attract attention, provoke institutions, intimidate opponents, appeal for sympathy, or 
promote adherence of the faithful, the common quality that all terrorists share is the 
perception of an absence of choice.87 
  
Alienation, Othering and Prejudice 
Although the four conventional wisdoms that Shapiro and Fair discuss do not 
completely or accurately speak to the reasons individuals are radicalized into terrorists, 
these assumptions share a common theme: the idea of othering. Emily Crenshaw explores 
othering by investigating the contrast between the depiction of homegrown and foreign 
terrorists in newspaper coverage. In this specific context, she defines othering as the 
process by which the media depicts the perpetrators as inherently unlike everyone else.88 
She argues that “a news cycle that habitually others the attacker and obscures the related 
political and social issues” through “coverage that emphasizes spectacle” and “employs 
vilifying language” pushes those following the news “towards certain extremities of 
opinion and thought that would not have been reached had those media narratives been 
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absent.”89 In his paper, ““Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and 
Academic Discourse,” Richard Jackson argues that the discrepancy underlying Emily 
Crenshaw’s observation—and the general terrorism discourse in general—reflects “a 
long tradition of culture stereotypes and deeply hostile media representations and 
depictions,” especially of Islam and Muslims.90 The frameworks used to depict Muslims 
in mainstream media are often centered on violence, threat, extremism, fanaticism and 
terrorism, on top of “a visual orientalist tradition in which they are portrayed as exotic 
and mysterious.”91 This distorted representation ties back to “deeper socio-cultural fears, 
anxieties and stereotypes of the oriental ‘other’ that go back to the imperial age.”92 But 
this othering does not only happen across nations and culture, but also within them.  
In the specific case of homegrown terrorism, Wilner and Dubouloz assert that 
socio-political alienation is one of the three precursors of radicalization.93 They explain 
that the discrimination, victimization and xenophobia, coupled with the lack of 
integration of Western Muslim communities with their larger societies, results in the 
failure of these individuals to assimilate or align with their host or even native country.94 
This in turn leads to what McCauley and Moskalenko refer to as group radicalization in 
like-minded groups. The alienation that Western Muslims feel pushes them to seek like-
minded individuals, leading to identification with a small, isolated group.95 The unity and 
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sense of belonging transforms feelings of helplessness and humiliation into potency and 
agency.96  
 
IV. RECRUITMENT PROCESS 
 Just as there is no single terrorist profile and no single pathway to radicalization, 
there is also no single form of recruitment. Every terrorist organization has varying 
selection processes and priorities that affect their recruitment operations in different 
ways.97 Terrorist organizations are not subject to the same rigidity, checks, or 
bureaucratic procedures that other systems are subject to, and thus are more malleable 
and evolve according to the circumstance. Bloom calls this “competitive adaptation,” or 
the ability for a terrorist organization to adapt “in response to changes in the security 
environment.”98 To illustrate this idea, she cites Al Qaeda as an example, explaining that 
as the group’s “capabilities declined, so too did the quality of its recruits, giving rise in 
recent years to the stereotype of the terrorist, far from the evil-mastermind in James Bond 
films and closer to the bumbler in the media and popular culture.”99A groups ability to 
recruit and retain effective terrorists depends on the effectiveness of the group’s system 
and structure, which hinges on three elements: culture, institution, and organization.  
 In terms of culture, Munger defines culture as “the set of “inherited” beliefs, 
attitudes, and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders, to understand 
themselves and to communicate with each other.”100 The culture of an organization can 
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be founded on the tenets of religion, political ideology, ethnicity, etc. However, it is 
important that we don’t misperceive these cultural elements as naturally leading to or 
inducing violence. The culture of the organization is more for the purposes of cohesion, 
not a justification for the use of violence. According to Munger, culture “is a commitment 
device, a way of solving the problem of high transactions costs in a setting where 
problems of ex post opportunism would otherwise eliminate ex ante chances and 
cooperation.”101 On one hand, “Institutions are the humanly devised rules of the game, 
formal (constitutions and laws) or informal (norms, moral systems, manners), but they 
tend to be long-lived and not easily evaluated, because there is no specific feedback 
metric for comparison.” The final element, organization, relates to the institution in the 
sense that it is the “optimizing response to the set of incentives and constraints created by 
institutions.”102 Bloom breaks down recruits into two distinct types of members: (a) 
individuals who are influenced by current terrorists to join the organization support the 
same political cause, or (b) the “hard-core ideology driven” individuals that volunteer to 
join the organization without being convinced by current members.103 Not only will the 
role of the recruits in the organization be based on whether they volunteer or are brought 
in by a talent spotter; their role will also relate to their background, connections, and 
skills, like any institution or corporation. For instance, Osama Bin Laden is known to 
have been a “terrorist CEO,” because he “applied business administration and modern 
management techniques to the running of a transnational terrorist organization” and 
implemented a similar framework used “by corporate executives throughout much of the 
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industrialized world.”104 Hoffman outlines the four different “positions” of terrorists 
within the structure of Al Qaeda’s organization:  
Four Different Levels - Operational Styles in Al Qaeda105 
1. The professional cadre: “Terrorist teams that are predetermined and carefully 
selected, are provided with very specific targeting instructions, and who are 
generously funded.” 
2. The trained amateurs: Terrorists who are “provided with a modicum of basic 
terrorist training… given open-ended targeting instructions.” 
3. The local walk-ins: “These are local groups of Islamic radicals who come up with 
a terrorist attack idea on their own and then attempt to obtain funding from al 
Qaeda for it.” 
4. Like-minded insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists: “This level embraces existing 
insurgent or terrorist groups who over the years have benefitted from bin Laden’s 
largesse and/or spiritual guidance; receiving training in Afghanistan… or have 
been provided with arms, materiel, and other assistance by the organization.” 
 
This goes back to Munger’s conception of an institution, because we are indeed making a 
judgement at the institutional level: “given our world view and moral beliefs, yes, 
terrorists are irrational, and even evil. But within the given and fixed, institutional setting 
in which they operate, terrorist militias are rational, optimizing responses to the 
incentives expectations, and constraints created by those institutions.”106 Though the 
likelihood that fiction will take the time to outline the structure or terrorists organizations 
to this degree of detail is low—as the focus would probably be on personal experience 
and emotional drive—it will be interesting to see how the novels capture the recruitment 
process if it is mentioned at all.  
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MOVING FORWARD 
 It is essential to point out that just because the aforementioned conventional 
wisdoms were challenged on their false premises does not mean that the elements they 
cite as being root causes of terrorism—poverty, lack of education, religiosity, support for 
Islamist parties, living in a non-democratic regime, and so on—do not in any way factor 
into someone choosing the path of terrorism. The argument presented in this chapter is 
not to render these misperceptions completely untrue or inaccurate, but to point out that 
these factors do not singularly and directly lead someone to become a terrorist. As 
Newman points out, “the vast majority of the millions of people who suffer from these 
grievances do not become terrorists. Most societies where these root causes exist do not 
give rise to terrorism.”107  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
To understand the comparisons and contrasts between the narrative of terrorism in 
academia and in fiction, I will be using a textual analysis methodology to qualitatively 
examine these novels. The structure and approach of this methodology is modeled on 
Robert Appelbaum’s and Alexis Paknadel’s typology for comparing terrorism novels as 
published in their paper, “Terrorism and the Novel, 1970-2001.” Out of a bibliography of 
over one thousand (1,000) works, Appelbaum and Paknadel used a sample of twenty-five 
(25) terrorism novels published between 1970 and 2001 for comparative analysis. Their 
aim for this investigation was to find recurring trends and themes within the literary 
canon on terrorism fiction. Although I am similarly looking for common trends and 
themes in these novels, I will be linking them back to the academic discussions on 
terrorism in order to see how their narratives compare. Thus, for the purposes of my 
thesis, I will have a different sample size and scope.  
While Appelbaum and Paknadel exclude post 9/11 novels from their sample, I 
believe that it is crucial to examine the treatment of terrorism in texts following 9/11, as it 
was an incredibly impactful event that morphed and reshaped the concept of “terrorism” 
into the fixed and inelastic abstraction that society presently holds. In his paper, 
“Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse,” 
Richard Jackson asserts:  
“One of the most important consequences of the 11 September 2001 
attacks was… [that] terrorism emerged as arguably the single most 
important security issue… At the same time, the terrorism discourse—the 
terms, assumptions, labels, categories and narratives used to describe and 
explain terrorism—has emerged as one of the most important political 
discourses of the modern era… As a term of elite and popular discourse, 
terrorism has come to possess clearly observable ideographic qualities. 
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That is, like ‘freedom,’ ‘democracy,’ and ‘justice,’ ‘terrorism now 
functions as a primary term for the central narratives of the culture, 
employed in political debate and daily conversation, but largely 
unquestioned in its meaning and usage.”108 
 
In other words, the current terrorism discourse is derived from the theories, information, 
and perceptions of terrorism studies, which “[grew] tremendously and gained genuine 
authority” since the 9/11 attacks.109 Therefore, my sample of five terrorism novels will 
consist of two novels published before September 2001 and three novels published after 
September 2001.  
In order to select five novels from the large sample of terrorism novels, I collected 
syllabi from academic courses that covered Terrorism and Fiction, looked at the novels 
that were included in these syllabi, and picked the three most popular novels from each 
period. In addition to reviewing the novels listed in academic syllabi, I surveyed eight 
academics whose expertise and specialities lay in terrorism and/or literature, and asked 
them to name the three best pre-9/11 terrorism novels and three best post-9/11 novels. 
Through this collection process, I came up with this short list of novels: 
Period Title, Author (Year) 
Pre-9/11 The Secret Agent, Joseph Conrad (1907) 
Mao II, Don DeLillo (1991) 
Post-9/11 Saturday, Ian McEwan (2005) 
The Terrorist, John Updike (2006)  
The Reluctant Fundamentalist, Moshin Hamid (2007) 
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 I acknowledge that in asking academic experts and consulting academic syllabi to 
determine the “best” novels on terrorism to read, this can mean that this selection of 
novels is more curated than if I were to pick novels based on other parameters, such as 
the number of copies sold. Due to the nature of this selection process, these novels—in 
comparison to the ones not recommended by these academic sources, are likely to present 
better (more accurate, more nuanced, more understanding) depictions of terrorists and 
terrorism than other fictionalized accounts of terrorism. However, even with this caveat, 
it is still valuable to analyze this selection of novels in order to see how they compare to 
both the media accounts of terrorism and discussions of terrorism in the academic sphere. 
It will be interesting to see what aspects of these fiction novels make them appealing to 
academics to the point where they not only read them, but assign them for class so that 
their students might glean a valuable perspective that will make them understand 
terrorism more completely.  
 I created a qualitative textual analysis rubric with which to evaluate each text for 
its characterization of terrorists. I used Appelbaum and Paknadel’s typology as a starting 
point for my rubric. For their typology, they had the following categories: 
1. Date / Author / Title, Genre, Register 
2. Protagonist(s) / Focalizer(s) 
3. Climactic Action 
4. Terrorist Incident(s) 
5. Identity of Terrorist(s) 
6. Identity of Target(s) 
7. Motives/Methods/Objectives of Terrorist(s) 
8. Location 
 
While I have incorporated these categories into my rubric, I expanded it further to focus 
in on the rhetorical mechanisms and techniques that these novel are using. Although 
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Appelbaum and Paknadel’s rubric effectively captured the data they needed to support 
their respective arguments, these eight categories are insufficient to distill, analyze, and 
evaluate the elements of the novels I will be investigating. More than identifying the 
conflict, the actors involved, and the perspective in which its relayed, I wanted to 
investigate how the delivery (the language, the tone, the diction) shapes these elements 
and manipulates the overall depiction of terrorism. While their rubric paints an accurate, 
clear picture of what narrative conveys, I believe that it is just as important to understand 
how the narrative is being delivered. For each novel, after outlining a brief 
synopsis/summary and explaining the historical context of the terrorist event that the 
novel is based on, the structure of my analysis for each novel will be as follows: 
1. Historical Context 
2. Misconceptions 
a. Characterization of the Terrorist 
b. Objectives and Motivations 
3. Challenging Misconceptions 
a. Characterization of the Terrorist 
b. Individual / Personal Motivations 
4. Radicalization and Recruitment 
a. Mechanisms of Radicalization 
b. Recruitment Process 
5. Takeaways 
 
 The “Characterization” category will examine the identity of the individual who 
engages in terrorist behavior: physical identity (physical appearance, age, nationality, 
ethnicity), social status (class, occupation, reputation), and relationships (family, friends, 
workplace). The “Setting” category will examine the kind of environment and society the 
terrorist operates in: location, time, as well as political and cultural context will be 
considered. The “Motivation” category will examine the terrorist’s individual reasons for 
engaging in terrorist activity, be it his/her opinions, views and stances on religion, 
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politics, nationality, etc. as well as the experiences that shape these views. The 
“Mechanisms of Radicalization” category will investigate the process by which the 
individual is radicalized. This process can be noted by drastic shifts in the individual’s 
perspective (encounters to do with othering, isolation, or violence), but can also be 
gradual developments that are exacerbated by events. The “Recruitment Process” 
category will bring attention to what the individual’s process of recruitment is like. The 
final “Takeaways” category will link the novel back to the role of the novelist to 
reintroduce humanity to these terrorist characters, pushing readers to rethink their 
relationship to them despite their horrendous actions.   
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CHAPTER 3: The Secret Agent 
Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent relays the story of Mr. Verloc, an agent 
provocateur set with the task of bombing the Greenwich Observatory in London. This 
task was ordered by Mr. Vladimir, a Russian diplomat, who is exasperated at the London 
police for refusing to arrest the anarchists. Mr. Verloc recruited his brother-in-law, 
Stevie, to help him carry out the job. However, Stevie is mentally challenged, and 
accidentally trips, detonating the bomb and killing himself in the process. Inspector Heat 
finds an address sown into the blown up coat he had found on site, and realizes that it’s 
Mr Verloc’s address. Inspector Heat visits Mr. Verloc’s home and tells Mrs. Verloc, 
Winnie, that her brother has died in the explosion. When Mr. Verloc returns home, he 
tries to apologize to her, and then blames her for Stevie’s death, for pushing the boy onto 
him, and for leading the police straight to them by sewing the address into Stevie’s coat. 
In a fit of rage, Winnie stabs Mr. Verloc and kills him. The novel ends with Winnie 
attempting to leave the country, but when one of Mr. Verloc’s friends thwarts her plans, 
she commits suicide by jumping off a boat.  
 
I HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 The Secret Agent, rather than referencing real terrorist attacks, was based on the 
real incident of a bomb explosion in Greenwich Park on February 15, 1894.110 Though it 
is not officially confirmed that the Observatory was the target, the man carrying the 
explosives, Martial Bourdin, was an anarchist carrying chemical explosives that most 
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likely detonated prematurely.111 Apparently, Bourdin was not only carrying the 
explosives when he left his lodging in Fitzroy street, but was also carrying a large sum of 
money, which suggests that he had the intention of escaping.112  
 
II MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of the Terrorist 
  Initially, when the story begins, Conrad plays into the archetype of the terrorist 
who is involved in criminal activity, is secluded from the rest of society, and operates in 
the shadows. Mr. Verloc is businessman who sells bric-a-brac and contraceptives, but 
also sells pornographic material. However, the fact that Mr. Verloc lives with his wife, 
her mother, and her younger brother, all of whom are aware of his trade, makes him more 
unusual and strange than sinister. Conrad presents Mr. Verloc as eccentric, but 
multifaceted, as the narrator comprises Mr. Verloc’s life of selling his “shady wares, 
[exercising] his vocation of a protector of society, and [cultivating] his domestic 
virtues.”113 This matter-of-fact, casual tone indicates to the reader that Mr. Verloc is not 
our villain, but our protagonist.  
Mr. Verloc is assigned to bomb the Greenwich Observatory by Mr. Vladimir, the 
new First Secretary in the embassy of what is assumed to be The Soviet Union. Mr. 
Vladimir addresses Mr. Verloc using a patronizing and condescending tone: he assumes 
Mr. Verloc to be incompetent. When conversing about how Mr. Verloc “began [his] 
connection with [them] by stealing the French gun designs” and got himself caught, Mr. 
Vladimir tells him that he “[doesn’t] seem to be very smart,” and that he “wouldn’t 
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deceive an idiot.”114 This links back to Bloom’s argument that terrorist organizations 
recruit “uneducated and underachieving” individuals.115 When Mr. Vladimir asks Mr. 
Verloc what he “[gets] out of a condition like this,” Mr. Vladimir points out that he 
“[hasn’t] got even the physique of [his] profession.”  
 As the novel goes on, it becomes apparent that Mr. Verloc is not as incompetent 
as his superior assumes him to be, and his complexity and nuance is revealed to us as he 
plots to bomb the Observatory and as he interacts with the members of his family. 
However, Conrad does present the readers with a terrorist character who is completely 
one-dimensional and projects several of the conventional wisdoms discussed in Chapter 
1. His ironically referred to as “the Professor,” and he is the one who constructs the bomb 
that Stevie carries to destroy the Greenwich Observatory. 
“His imagination had been fired early by the tales of men rising from the 
depths of poverty to positions of authority and affluence. The extreme, 
almost ascetic purity of his thought, combined with an astounding 
ignorance of worldly conditions, had set before him a goal of power and 
prestige to be attained without the medium of arts, graces, tact and 
wealth—by the sheer weight of merit alone. The way of even the most 
justifiable revolutions is prepared by personal impulses disguised into 
creeds. The Professor’s indignation found in itself a final cause that 
absolved him from the sin of turning to destruction as the agent of his 
ambition. To destroy public faith in legality was the imperfect formula of 
his pedantic fanaticism; but the subconscious conviction that the 
framework of an established social order cannot be effectually shattered 
except by some form of collective or individual violence was precise and 
correct.”116 
 
In this passage, Conrad injects so much diction relating to the distorted terrorism 
discourse and the misperceptions it is based on: “poverty,” “ignorance,” “impulses,” 
“destruction,” “fanaticism,” and “violence.” Unlike Mr. Verloc, who engages in acts of 
                                               
114 Conrad, The Secret Agent, 17. 
115 Bloom, “Constructing Expertise: Terrorism Recruitment,” 604. 
116 Conrad, The Secret Agent, 64-65. 
  
Lilles 37 
terrorism as part of his job in order to earn income to support his family, the Professor 
seeks to take revenge and “shatter” the “framework of an established social order” to 
addresses his “indignation” deriving from his low socioeconomic status. As the 
conventional wisdom relating to poverty assumes, the Professor turned to terrorism in 
response to his frustration with his place in the socioeconomic order, and hoped to gain 
“authority and affluence” by engaging in terrorism.117 Furthermore, diction like 
“extreme,” “purity,” “creed,” “sin” and “faith” give the Professor’s motivations a 
religious undertone, which plays into the conventional wisdom that there is a correlation 
between religiosity and violence. On top of it all, to mention all these motivations and 
then say that he also had an “astounding ignorance of worldly conditions,” diluting his 
justifications even further and rendering him incompetent and undereducated. By the time 
the readers get to the end of this passage where the narrator explains that destruction has 
become his “agent of ambition” and that violence is the best way to “destroy public faith 
in legality,” we have already characterized the Professor as irrational, dangerous, and 
mislead. Conrad feeds the readers a vindictive, power-hungry and ignorant terrorist to 
serve as a foil to Mr. Verloc. Compared to the Professor, Mr. Verloc is less nihilistic and 
menacing.  
 Another character in the novel who serves as a parallel to Mr. Verloc is Stevie, his 
brother-in-law that he recruits to help him carry out the mission. While the Professor 
embodies the conventional wisdoms relating to religiosity, poverty, and lack of 
education, Stevie embodies the misperception that individuals who are mentally ill are 
more likely to become terrorists. Winnie, Mr. Verloc’s wife, believes that her “delicate 
                                               
117 Shapiro and Fair. “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” 81.  
  
Lilles 38 
brother” or “the poor boy was pretty safe in this rough world” under the tutelage of Mr. 
Verloc.118 Although the novel does not explicitly state that Stevie has a mental illness, it 
is apparent in the way he interacts with his family that he has some sort of condition. 
With that, it is intriguing that Conrad writes him to then be the one to handle the bomb, 
and then to make a mistake and end up killing himself. 
 
Objective / Motivations 
 The motivation for the bombing of the Greenwich Observatory is voiced by Mr. 
Vladimir. He explains to Mr. Verloc that he is “not very satisfied with the attitude of the 
police here,” and that the bombing should stimulate “the vigilance of the police” and “the 
severity of the magistrates,” as “the general leniency of the judicial procedure here, and 
the utter absence of all repressive measures, are a scandal to Europe.”119 In other words, 
Mr. Vladimir wants the police to be more effective and punitive in fighting the anarchists. 
He goes on to say that the bombing will serve as “the accentuation of the unrest—of the 
fermentation which undoubtedly exists” in English society.”120 He comments on what he 
wants the international impact of the attack to look like: 
“What we want is to administer a tonic to the Conference in Milan. Its 
deliberations upon international action for the suppression of political 
crime don’t seem to get anywhere. England lags. This country is absurd 
with its sentimental regard for individual liberty… England must be 
brought into line. The imbecile bourgeoisie of this country make 
themselves the accomplices of the very people whose aim is to drive them 
out of their houses to starve in ditches. And they have the political power 
still, if they only had the sense to use it for their preservation. I suppose 
you agree that the middle classes are stupid?”121 
 
                                               
118 Conrad, The Secret Agent, 7. 
119 Conrad, The Secret Agent, 14. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 24. 
  
Lilles 39 
Again, because Mr. Verloc is technically part of the counter-terrorist force commiting a 
terror attack in order to pressure the police force into taking a more aggressive stand 
against the anarchists, the objectives of his mission are necessarily based on a more 
political than personal stance. As Martha Crenshaw points, terrorism can serve “to disrupt 
and discredit the processes of government” by aiming at the “insecurity and 
demoralization of government officials.”122  As Mr. Verloc explains in the passage above, 
the bombing of the Greenwich Observatory is meant to put England in line and pressure 
them into taking action against those who seek to destroy the regime. 
 
III CHALLENGING MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of the Terrorist 
 One of Conrad’s most interesting authorial choices in this novel is that Mr. Verloc 
is not the terrorist in this situation, even if he is the one assigned with committing an act 
of terrorism. He infiltrates anarchist ranks in order gather intelligence and build a 
network, but the bombing is for the purpose of emboldening the police to crack down on 
the anarchists themselves. Embedded in this inversion is some strong commentary on 
how governments themselves use acts of terrorism, though they are not labelled as the 
terrorists. The narrator explicitly highlights this discrepancy in judgement and rhetoric: 
“The terrorist and the policeman both come from the same basket. Revolution, legality—
counter moves in the same game; forms of idleness at bottom identical.”123 
Even if Conrad paints Mr. Verloc in a dubious light, as captured by his low class, 
his business, and his isolation, he also strips Mr. Verloc’s occupation from the political, 
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religious, or terror agenda associated with it. Instead of characterizing Mr. Verloc as a 
cold-blooded terrorist, he is depicted as someone who performs the job solely for the 
income and security, and is actually quite indifferent to the political objectives:  
“His idleness was not hygienic, but it suited him very well. He was in a 
manner devoted to it with a sort of inert fanaticism, or perhaps rather with 
a fanatical inertness… He was too lazy even for a mere demagogue, for a 
workman orator, for a leader of labour. It was too much trouble. He 
required a more perfect form of ease; or it might have been that he was the 
victim of a philosophical unbelief in the effectiveness of every human 
effort… His general get-up was that of a well-to-do mechanic in business 
for himself… But there was also about him an indescribable air which no 
mechanic could have acquired in the practice of his handicraft however 
dishonestly exercised: the air common to men who live on the vices, the 
follies, or the baser fears of mankind; the air of moral nihilism common to 
keepers of gambling hells and disorderly houses; to private detectives and 
inquiry agents; to drink sellers and, should I say, to the sellers of 
invigorating electric belts and to the inventors of patent medicines.”124 
 
The academic theory posits that individuals partake in terrorism because they believe that 
violence is the alternative they can pursue to resolve their grievance and loss or achieve 
their personal/political/religious objective. In other words, terrorism gives these 
individuals agency and purpose, an opportunity to take the solution in their own hands 
and—provided with the resources, network, and organization—act on their beliefs. 
However, Mr. Verloc is far from the determined, active, zealot we assume terrorists to be. 
In the excerpt above, the narrator highlights his “idleness” and “fanatical inertness.” 
Going against the conventional wisdom, Mr. Verloc’s participation in terrorism has 
nothing to do with a political agenda or ideology, be it a “demagogue,” a “workman 
orator,” or a “leader of labour.” Instead of feeling like he had the power to shape policy 
and influence people through his actions, he is characterized as “the victim of a 
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philosophical unbelief in the effectiveness of human effort.” This outlook seems to be 
antithetical to be driving an individual to become a terrorist.  
 
Individual / Personal Motivations 
Mr. Verloc’s lack of ideological or personal stakes in the violent act he is 
involved in prevents the readers from immediately forming an either positive or negative 
view of him. The fact that he “did not trouble” with the labels of anarchist or socialist or 
proletariat is because his mission is life is simply “the protection of the social 
mechanism, not its perfectionment or even its criticism.125 Perhaps what Conrad is 
arguing is that even if Mr. Verloc operates within the anarchists’ ranks, he is still part of 
the counterterrorist force, and thus does not have the same resolve or intense drive to 
fight and inflict violence as terrorists do.  
 
IV RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT 
Mechanisms of Radicalization 
The Secret Agent only touches on Mr. Verloc’s past in conversation, hinting that 
Mr. Verloc was in the military prior to becoming a secret agent, and currently is a spy 
working for a foreign government. But what Conrad puts significant emphasis on is Mr. 
Verloc’s relationship with his wife, Winnie, and by extension, with her brother, Stevie. 
This focus provides ample evidence to show not Mr. Verloc’s radicalization, but Stevie’s. 
The strong familial ties of the Verloc family points to “The Power of Love” mechanism 
that McCauley and Moskalenko discuss as one of the paths to individual radicalization. 
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According to them, the love that comes with familial ties is integral to an impenetrable 
organization structure, for though “trust may determine the network within which radicals 
and terrorists recruit,” it is love that “often determines who will join.”126 After Inspector 
Heat breaks the news to Winnie that Stevie has died in the bombing attempt, Mr. Verloc 
reflects on Stevie’s character: 
“Mr Verloc never meant Stevie to perish with such abrupt violence. He 
did not mean him to perish at all. Stevie dead was a much greater nuisance 
than ever he had been when alive. Mr Verloc had argued a favourable 
issue to his enterprise, basing himself not on Stevie’s intelligence, which 
sometimes plays queer tricks with a man, but on the blind docility and on 
the blind devotion of the boy. Though not much of a psychologist, Mr 
Verloc had gauged the depth of Stevie’s fanaticism.”127   
 
The important takeaway from this excerpt is that Stevie’s “docility,” “devotion,” and 
“fanaticism” was not geared towards a larger political or religious goal, but was a 
manifestation of the love, affection, and loyalty he felt towards his family. Even though 
Mr. Verloc then refers to him as a “nuisance” or an accident that now had to be covered 
up, he still acknowledged that allegiance to him was unbreakable, and is the reason Mr. 
Verloc feels remorseful and accountable for his death.  
 
Recruitment Process 
Again, there is not much detail given to Mr. Verloc’s recruitment process as a 
secret agent. The only indication we get of his past is that he had “done his military 
service in the French artillery.”128 In contrast, Stevie did not receive any formal training 
or education on the matter, which is a divergence from the academic literature on terrorist 
recruitment, given the nature of the task Stevie was given. Towards the end of The Secret 
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Agent, the narrator discusses that Stevie was recruited informally by taking strolls with 
Mr. Verloc:  
“He had foreseen Stevie arrested, and was not afraid, because Mr Verloc 
had a great opinion of Stevie’s loyalty, which had been carefully 
indoctrinated with the necessity of silence in the course of many walks. 
Like a peripatetic philosopher, Mr Verloc, strolling along the streets of 
London, had modified Stevie’s view of the police by conversations full of 
subtle reasonings. Never had a sage a more attentive and admiring 
disciple. The submission and worship were so apparent that Mr Verloc had 
come to feel something like a liking for the boy.”129 
 
The intriguing thing about this passage is that it does not read like a methodical, vigilant, 
rigorous procedure. It reads more like a father figure and a young adolescent spending 
quality time together. As McCauley and Moskalenko put it, “after an individual joins a 
radical group, love for friends and comrades in the group is likely to increase further as 
common goals and common threats increase group cohesion.”130 In literary terms, Mr. 
Verloc serves as Stevie’s mentor, and the mentor role is a common trope in fiction. 
Instead of illustrating recruitment as a process, Conrad highlights the importance of 
relationships in terrorist organizations, which—though this theme is an undercurrent in 
academic theories—is absent from the news and media. Given that these two men are the 
terrorists, they could have easily been painted as the antagonist and his henchman. But 
Conrad does away with that perspective and paints Mr Verloc as the “sage” and the 
“philosopher,” while Stevie is the “[loyal],” “attentive,” “admiring” disciple. The 
injection of affection and care into this relationship between the current member and the 
trainee, Conrad achieves the dual purpose of a) humanizing them and b) showcasing that 
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individuals choose to partake in terrorism for reasons other than—or in addition to—
revenge, sadism, and fanaticism.  
This excerpt highlights the idea that instead of a step-by-step process, 
indoctrination and recruitment can happen fluidly and simultaneously. And especially in 
having a member-recruit relationship connected through emotional, personal ties, the 
recruitment reinforces and strengthens a sense of belonging.  
 
TAKEAWAYS 
 What The Secret Agent highlights about terrorism that is absent from explanations 
is the role of personal relationships and their importance in terrorism. Conrad turns the 
people we have perceived as vicious monsters and killing machines by removing their 
tough exterior and showing them care for one another. The Secret Agent sheds light on 
the side of the binary that is not prominent in academic text; yes, terrorist organizations 
need recruits, but recruits join organizations for more than the cause. They join these 
groups because they need a community, a support system who will welcome them, keep 
them safe, and give them a sense of belonging. When individuals have been ostracized 
and discriminated against, they can be pushed to engaging in terrorist activity if it means 
that they get to be a part of a greater community who values and understands them.  
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CHAPTER 4: Mao II 
Don DeLillo’s Mao II is distinct from the other novels in the sense that it weaves 
multiple stories into one narrative. In relation to the theme of terrorism, there are two 
stories that are strung together. The first string follows the central protagonist, Bill Gray, 
an author living a reclusive life, struggling to finish the novel he is currently working on. 
Gray secretly agrees to a request of his former editor, Charles, to travel to London to 
speak on behalf of a Swiss writer being held hostage in Beirut. When Charles and Gray 
meet at a cafe in London, a bomb detonates and destroys the cafe, though Charles and 
Gray make it out alive. They are taken to safety, and then Gray is introduced to George 
Haddad, a representative of the Maoist group who kidnapped the writer. Gray decides to 
go to Lebanon himself and negotiate the release of the hostage, and leaves for Beirut 
behind Charles’ back. While at a stopover in Cyprus, waiting for a ship to take him to 
Lebanon, Bill is hit by a car and suffers a lacerated liver, which kills him in his sleep 
while en route to Beirut.  
The second string of the story is from the perspective of the Swiss writer that 
Gray planned to speak on behalf of, and shares his experiences in captivity. Mao II is 
sprinkled with small snippets of him interacting with his captor. While Gray and the 
Swiss writer are connected via the fact that they are both writers, they never meet each 
other. But, the two strings are directly weaved together by another character, Brita, a 
photojournalist. In the first string of the story, Brita photographs Bill in his home and 
talks to him about writing and the political dimensions of his stories. In the second string 
of the story, Brita travels to Beirut to photograph Abu Rashid, the leader of the terrorist 
organization responsible for the kidnapping of the Swiss poet.  
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I HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 The circumstances upon which Mao II is centered are based upon the Lebanon 
Hostage Crisis, the decade (1982 to 1992) in which the Iranian-backed terrorist group, 
Hezbollah, systematically abducted foreign nationals in Lebanon.131 Of all the 
kidnappings, 96 of the captives were Westerners who were involved in the foreign forces 
in Lebanon, particularly Americans who were part of the peacekeeping operation.132 On 
June 14, 1985, a Trans World Airlines flight en route from Rome to Athens was seized by 
Hezbollah terrorists and diverted to Beirut.133 By June 17, the 40 remaining hostages 
were extracted from the plane and held hostage throughout Beirut by Hezbollah.134 The 
hostage crisis lasted for 17 days, and the terrorist organization had a list of demands, 
including the release of those involved in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in 
Beirut.135 Other than the Flight 847 passengers, American nationals included Dean of 
Agriculture at the American University of Beirut, Thomas Sutherland; Director of the 
American University Hospital, David Jacobsen; Chief Middle East correspondent for the 
Associated Press, Terry Anderson; Roman Catholic priest Rev. Lawrence Martin Jenco; 
American University librarian Peter Kilburn; Presbyterian minister Rev. Benjamin Weir; 
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and Political Officer at the American Embassy, William Buckley.136 By June 17, 1991, 
all the hostages were released.137  
 
II MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of the Terrorist 
The misconceptions in this novel house themselves in the first string of the 
narrative, or the parts of the novel that are centered around Bill Gray, the novelist. When 
Gray arrives in London, he meets his former editor, Charles, at a cafe. Charles explains 
that “there’s a young man held hostage in Beirut. He’s Swiss, a UN worker who was 
doing research on health care in Palestinian camps. He’s also a poet… We know next to 
nothing about the group that has him. The hostage is the only proof they exist.”138 
Previous to this conversation, terrorists were only spoken about in general terms, in the 
broader context of the war on terror. But the first detail we get about terrorist actors in 
this novel is that the non-terrorist characters “know next to nothing” about them. With no 
indication of the group’s motivations or justifications, this omission of characterization 
primes the readers to fall into the trap of conceptualizing them as the crazy extremists 
committing indiscriminate acts of violence for fear and revenge, and nothing else.139 The 
hostage is the only element to base their characterization on, which results in these 
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terrorists being immediately alienated and dehumanized as they are branded the evil 
villain, and their hostage the victim.  
 
Objectives and Motivations 
 Within the same conversation in the cafe, Charles explains to Gray that the 
terrorist organization had received word that they were hosting an event on behalf of the 
hostage, and that he had been “receiving phone calls. Anonymous… bomb threats.”140 
Gray dismisses Charles’ concern for their safety, claiming that “people who make phone 
calls don’t set off bombs. The real terrorists make their calls after the damage is done. If 
at all.”141 Due to their anonymity and elusive identification, Gray dismisses their threat 
on the grounds of superiority and is complacent about his belief that nothing will happen 
because he thinks it uncharacteristic for a terrorist to notify someone that they are acting 
before they do so. This exchange between Charles and Gray shows how the lack of 
understanding about terrorist motivations and actions can lead to dehumanization that 
leads to considering the terrorists as evil, mysterious monsters (as Charles does) or as 
incompetent, inferior people (as Gray does).  
Shortly after this exchange, the cafe indeed explodes. The blast made “[Gray] jerk 
half around but he didn’t leave his feet or go back against the wall. He felt the sound in 
his chest and arms. He jerked and ducked, shielding his head with his forearm, windows 
blowing out… The street was filled with glass, snowblinking.”142 Not only is Gray’s 
complacency undermined, but Charles’ anxieties are realized. Again, there are no faces, 
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bodies, or reasons attached to this attack, and all the readers have to judge the terrorists is 
this visual imagery of the explosion. When the bomb explodes in the cafe, Gray and 
Charlie come out of it dazed, but unharmed. Charles argues that “the bomb was the 
culmination. They made their point even if we don’t know exactly what it is.”143In 
depicting them as this unknown, omniscient force, DeLillo brands these terrorists as an 
all-powerful, all knowing, evil entity, instead of an organized group of human beings 
acting with a political agenda.  
 
III CHALLENGING MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of Terrorist 
The very conventional wisdoms that are conveyed in Bill Gray’s narrative are 
challenged by the second string focused on the Swiss hostage. The terrorist character in 
these scenes is juxtaposed against the anonymous force in the London bombing scenes. 
Through these dual narratives, DeLillo showcases the dichotomies between the foreign 
and the familiar, the private and the public, as well as highlights the relationship between 
action and intention. When the terrorist character enters the novel, he is referred to as a 
“boy.” Instead of the professional adult portrayed in The Secret Agent or The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist, Mao II portrays the terrorist as a child. The torture the boys inflicts on 
the captive is explicit in its visual imagery: 
“The boy tortured him sometimes. Knocked him down, told him to stand. 
Knocked him down, told him to stand. The boy tried to pull his teeth out 
of his mouth with his bare hands. The pain extended long past the boy’s 
departure from the room… The boy had him lie on his back with legs bent 
up and he beat the bottom of the prisoner’s feet with a reinforcing rod. The 
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pain made it hard for him to sleep and this stretched and deepened time, 
gave it a consciousness, a quality of ingenious and pervasive presence.”144 
 
The child enacting these horrible means of torture upon this innocent writer creates a 
disconnect, as the readers have difficulty reconciling the  innocence associated with 
childhood with the ruthless violence of terrorism. To repeat the word “boy” several times 
in this excerpt, and have it associated with violent phrases like “knocked him down,” 
“pull his teeth,” and “beat” with a “rod,” DeLillo paints a very different picture of a 
terrorist than what is portrayed in the press and media. Later on, the boy’s physical 
appearance is mentioned. Because the boy is wearing a hood himself, the narrator can 
make no comments on the boy’s age or ethnic features, and only mentions that the boy 
“wore a dark T-shirt under the top part of someone’s jogging suit and almost always had 
fatigue pants and ratty striped sneakers.”145 Again, DeLillo removes identity from the 
picture when forming the image of his terrorist, and instead puts him in common clothes 
that everyone can picture. Though subtle, the tool of using material things to create 
familiarity (and ultimately, sympathy) is powerful in its impersonality.  
 
Individual / Personal Motivations 
Unlike the other novels examined in this thesis, the boy has absolutely no 
dialogue, and all of his actions are rendered through the perspective of the victim. The 
readers get no entry into his thoughts or motivations, and we are left to infer for ourselves 
what his intentions are. DeLillo further characterizes this child terrorist by showcasing 
that instead of being someone who is strategic and deliberate and cautious, he is rather 
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random and forgetful. For instance, the captive—who is the narrator for these scenes—
observes that the boy sometimes forgets to put the captive’s hood back on after meal 
times and forgets meals altogether.146  He describes the boy as “the bearer of 
randomness.”147 The haphazard behavior of the boy seems to go against Hoffman’s 
argument that terrorism “has always been and will always be instrumental: planned, 
purposeful and premeditated.”148 However, this divergence is not created by depicting the 
terrorist as an individual who is incompetent, reckless, or mentally ill. The inconsistency 
of the boy does not lead the readers to believe that he is inferior to them. Rather, his 
inconsistency humanizes him, and conveys that although the violence he is inflicting on 
the captive is indeed “planned, purposeful, and premeditated,” he is not a killing machine 
who is absent of morality and humanity. At one point, the Swiss writer mentions that 
“there were times when the boy pretended to leave the room but remained to watch 
him.”149 While it might be a little of a stretch to say that the boy cared for the hostage, 
this shows that the boy was at least intrigued, contemplative, or curious. The Swiss writer 
even mentions that he “identified with the boy,” and “saw himself as someone who might 
become the boy through the effortless measure of the mind thinking back.”150 Even the 
captive himself recognized that the boy was operating under a logic that he understood as 
not being very far off from his own. Perhaps the hostage sees what Munger argues, in that 
the culture of an organization is a “conditioning force” on behavior, and provides an 
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explanation for terrorist acts that are deemed as “irrational.”151 Through the hostage, the 
reader understands that the boy has been conditioned to inflict violence, and that even 
though it seems as if he’s operating independently, there is an understanding that he is 
absent of choice.  
Though the boy torturing the hostage juxtaposes the unknown voice responsible 
for the bombing of the cafe, the challenges to conventional wisdoms are not only found in 
this second string of narrative. After seeking refuge from the explosion in the cafe, 
Charles introduces Gray to George Haddad, a political scientist and representative of the 
Maoist group who kidnapped the Swiss writer. In his conversation with Charles and 
George, Gray asks if the group is “a new fundamentalist element.”152 Essentially, Gray is 
assuming that the organization operating in Beirut is comprised of religious extremists. 
However, George—and by extension, Don DeLillo—pivots from this assumption and 
informs Gray that “they’re a new communist element.”153 He explains that the “unit that 
took the poet is one element in a movement. Barely a movement actually. It’s just an 
underground current at this stage, an assertion that not every weapon in Lebanon has to 
be marked Muslim, Christian, or Zionist.”154 
George goes on to outline that “there are leftist elements” of the Lebanese 
Communist Party that are “aligned with Syria,” and that “the PLO has always had a 
Marxist component and they’re active again in Lebanon.”155 First, by aligning the 
anonymous group with the Communist ideology instead of religion, DeLillo unhinges the 
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reader from the assumption that violence is linked to religiosity, and instead puts a 
political objective at the forefront.156 And second, by qualifying this group as an 
“element” and “component” of the larger Communist party, DeLillo challenges the 
conventional wisdom that the absence of democracy leads to violence by showcasing that 
not all non-democratic parties are inherently in support of violence and terrorism.157  
 
Act of Terror 
 After the bomb attack on the cafe, Gray tells Charles that “[he] didn’t expect an 
explosion. But the second it happened I stood in the blast and it seemed completely 
logical. It seemed legitimate and well argued.”158 Gray goes on to say that “terror is the 
force that begins with a handful of people in a backroom… Take up the case of the 
downtrodden, the spat-upon… Order is consistent with permanent revolution.”159 This 
acceptance that there is a logic and framework here that cannot be understood except by 
the terrorists themselves is an idea that pervades both strings of narrative in Mao II. It is 
something that Gray recognizes in the actions of the terrorists who blew up the cafe, and 
it is something the Swiss hostage acknowledges about the boy who tortures him. As 
Munger puts it, “the U.S. and its allies are playing one game, and the people we label 
“terrorists” are playing another.”160  
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IV RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT  
Mechanisms of Radicalization 
 It is in this final scene that we also realize that the boy torturing the captive is the 
son of Abu Rashid, the leader of the terrorist organization. Through the perspective of 
Brita, the boy is described as “very dark, wearing the picture of his father safety-pinned 
to his shirt, and his eyes are slightly murderous, this is the only word, but also completely 
calm and completely aware.”161 Finally, in the reveal of the boy’s identity and affiliation 
to the organization, the narrator characterizes him as evil and criminal. This reveal 
harkens back to McCauley and Moskalenko’s fourth individual radicalization 
mechanism: “The Power of Love.” They state that because a huge part of recruitment 
involves personal connections with existing terrorists, organizations recruit “from the 
network of friends, lovers and family” in order to avoid taking someone in who might 
betray the organization to the authorities.162 Mia Bloom speaks to the prevalence of 
“kinship recruitment,” and cites Chechen and Irish Terrorist Organizations, as well as 
ISIS as examples of groups that recruit family members together in order to fortify the 
group’s operational secrecy and protect against infiltration.163 In reference to the specific 
case of kinship recruitment presented in Mao II, Bloom explains that oftentimes “younger 
brothers or children of recruits easily step into their siblings’ or father’s shoes,” and this 
transition helps to secure the longevity of terrorist organizations.164 This circumstance is 
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similar to that presented in The Secret Agent, except it is blood instead of marriage that 
binds the two terrorists.  
 
Recruitment Process 
 In the last scene of the novel, before Brita speaks to Abu Rashid, she passes a 
group of boys in the courtyard sitting down, listening to a man. When Brita asks Abu 
Rashid what the boys are learning, Abu Rashid, through the mouth of his interpreter, 
gives her the following explanation:  
“We teach them identity, sense of purpose. They are all children of Abu 
Rashid. All men one man. Every militia in Beirut is filled with hopeless 
boys taking drugs and drinking and stealing. Car thieves. The shelling 
ends and they run out to steal car parts. We teach that our children belong 
to something strong and self-reliant. They are not an invention of Europe. 
They are not making a race to go to God. We don’t train them for paradise. 
No martyrs here. The image of Rashid is their identity.”165 
 
This passage reflects academic theories by  conveying how terrorist organizations utilize 
education as a recruitment tool. Several terrorist organizations use schools as recruitment 
grounds by transmitting group ideologies, mental and physical training, and 
indoctrination through the education system.166 By linking a sense of “identity” with a 
goal or a “sense of purpose,” DeLillo’s words align with Bloom’s argument that 
indoctrination and recruitment are not so much seperate steps in a linear procedure, but 
rather an interwoven process that happens organically and simultaneously.167  It diverges 
from the common tropes of motivations for why one should participate in terrorism. 
Stating that the boys “are not an invention of Europe” implies that the leaders of this 
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group do not rely on anti-Western sentiment to create a narrative of victimization that 
enrages the boys and in turn antagonizes the enemy. Nor do they preach that participating 
in violence will help them in their “race to go to God,” which signifies that the leaders do 
not base their ideology on Islam. It is evident that DeLillo is all too aware of the 
conventional wisdoms that surround the conversation of what makes up the terrorist 
profile, and rejects these misperceptions in the voice of a leader of a terrorist 
organization. Like The Secret Agent, Mao II highlights that indoctrination and 
recruitment go hand-in-hand.  
 What makes this scene so compelling is that it reads like a military commander 
addressing his platoon, but in actuality, it is a father talking to his son and children his 
son’s age who have suffered great pain and loss in the Lebanese civil war. As Gause puts 
it,  
“Terrorist organizations are not mass-based organizations. They are small 
and secretive. They are not organized or based on democratic principles. 
They revolve around strong leaders and a cluster of committed followers 
who are willing to take actions from which the vast majority of people, 
even those who might support their political agenda, would rightly 
shrink.”168 
 
This statement harkens back to Munger’s argument on culture, and how this particularly 
organization fosters a culture that is centered on action, merit and purpose instead of 
religion, crime and ethnicity. This is the invisible instrument that conditioned the boy to 
torture the hostage, and this is most likely the same instrument that allowed the terrorists 
who blew up the cafe to justify their act of violence. 
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TAKEAWAYS 
 DeLillo artfully weaves two narratives together, with each string conveying a 
different depiction of terrorism. This juxtaposition of narratives is something that is 
unique to Mao II and effectively demonstrates that there is neither a single terrorist 
profile nor a single pathway to terrorism. Most importantly, DeLillo does not portray his 
non-terrorist characters as achieving clarity or complete understanding as to why 
terrorists act the way they do. Neither Gray nor the Swiss hostage ever get any insight 
into the motivations behind the terrorists that harmed them, but at the end of the day, they 
recognized that they never would. But instead of casting them aside as irrational, illogical 
and murderous, the two of them retained a humanize view of their terrorists, 
acknowledging that though they were operating on a different framework, they were 
human beings all the same. 
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CHAPTER 5: Saturday 
 Ian McEwan’s novel, Saturday, follows a British neurosurgeon, Henry Perowne, 
as he goes about his Saturday. The novel catalogues his routine and his errands: his early 
rising due to insomnia, breakfast with his son Theo, a squash game with his American 
colleague, Jay, grocery shopping for this evening’s family dinner, visiting his mother in a 
mental institution, etc. However, this routine is disrupted when he gets into a car accident 
and a brawl ensues between him and the passengers of the other car. Though he is able to 
escape, unbeknownst to Henry, he is followed to his house. The two men invade his 
home by entering with a knife to his wife’s throat. They harm the grandfather and force 
his daughter to strip naked. Henry calls out the perpetrator’s mental condition, lying to 
him and saying that there is a cure. He lures the perpetrator to his study on the second 
floor, where he and his son are able to push the perpetrator down the stairs. The story 
ends with Perowne performing a brain surgery on the very criminal who harmed him, 
invaded his home, and terrorized his family.  
 
I HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 Saturday takes place on February 15, 2003, the day when protesters filled the 
streets of almost 800 cities across the globe to voice their opposition against the war in 
Iraq.169 Specifically, the novel is set in London, United Kingdom, where, according to the 
police, at least 750,000 people took part in Britain’s biggest ever demonstration. Indeed, 
the organisers of the protest put the figure closer to two million.170 In fact, this is a line 
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straight from the novel regarding the protests: “The police are saying that two hundred 
and fifty thousand have gathered in central London. Someone for the rally is insisting on 
two million people by the middle of the afternoon.”171 The demonstration showcased the 
disapproval of the British public to Prime Minister Tony Blair’s decision to support the 
U.S. in its military action against Iraq. Blair stated in a speech that he did not “seek 
unpopularity as a badge of honor,” but “sometimes it is the price of leadership and the 
cost of conviction.”172 The U.S. invasion of Iraq is an important backdrop because it 
primes the reader into thinking about the turbulent political climate in the Middle East. 
The way that the tension is built up in the novel makes the readers anticipate some sort of 
attack, and with this political moment in the background, it pushes the readers to 
assuming that the terrorist will mirror the conventional wisdoms that are popular in the 
discourse. However, McEwan undoes all of this priming in the last third of the novel and, 
in one brilliant inversion, dismantles the misperceptions that he had made the readers 
assume, though this will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
In terms of perspective, Saturday is written in the third person. However, unlike 
The Secret Agent or Mao II, this point of view only follows one character instead of 
moving between the streams of consciousness of other characters. The story is centered 
around British neurosurgeon, Henry Perowne. The historical context of the war on terror 
is perhaps the most peripheral in this novel, but is nevertheless a powerful undercurrent 
that sets up a lot of parallels. Therefore, because the story is told from the perspective of 
a civilian who is not involved in politics, government, or a terrorist organization, it is 
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expected that the readers will be exposed to certain misconceptions about the types of 
people terrorists are.  
 
II MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of the Terrorist  
 Although the “terrorist” character in the novel represents all the challenges to the 
misconceptions surrounding terrorism, McEwan presents the readers with several 
conventional wisdoms before the terrorist enters the plot. There are three significant 
instances in particular that Saturday showcases Perowne’s distorted perspective because 
he subscribes to these misperceptions. First, the novel begins with Perowne waking up in 
the middle of the night due to his insomnia and, through his window, sees a plane in the 
distance, going down in flames. This sparks his reflection on the current international 
political moment: the war on terror and the Middle East. This event catalyzes his 
contemplation on terrorism and violence, and this motif persists as the narrative 
continues. As he watches the plane and the plume of smoke trailing behind it as it 
descends, he reflects on the 9/11 attacks that occurred two years before: 
“[Perowne] often wonders how it might go—the screaming in the cabin 
partly muffled by that deadening acoustic, the fumbling in bags for phones 
and last words, the airline staff in their terror clinging to remembered 
fragments of procedure, the levelling smell of shit. But the scene 
construed from the outside, from afar like this, is also familiar. It’s already 
almost eighteen months since half the planet watched, and watched again, 
the unseen captives driven through the sky to the slaughter, at which time 
there gathered round the innocent silhouette of any jet plane a novel 
association. Everyone agrees, airliners look different in the sky these days, 
predatory or doomed.”173  
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Just as how the novel is set on the day of the global anti-war protests against the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq, Perowne’s linkage of the plane he sees to the 9/11 attacks sets the reader 
up to assume that the terrorist in the novel will be a jihadist from the Middle East. But 
instead of explaining the motivations behind the attack or who the perpetrators were, 
Perowne’s thoughts only focus on the “screaming,” “fumbling,” and “clinging” of the 
“innocent” captives “driven through the sky to the slaughter.” The emphasis on the 
violence and the omission of an explanation for this violence paints the 9/11 hijackers as 
the “irrational homicidal maniacs” that pervade the distorted narrative.174 In addition, 
Perowne’s insight at the end of this reflection about how every airplane seen in the sky 
will now look “predatory or doomed” feeds into the incomplete narrative that terrorists 
commit these indiscriminate acts of violence solely to horrify the public.  
 Another instance that highlights a conventional wisdom is when Perowne listens 
to the news in order to find out more about the plane he saw in the early hours of his 
Saturday. Be it on the radio or the TV screen, the information and speculation that is 
relayed to him aligns with his reflections on the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. war against 
Iraq. First, there is speculation that the two pilots of the plane are Chechens. When 
Perowne checks back on the news while he is preparing dinner, an airport official 
concedes “that one of the men is of Chechen origin, but [denies] a rumour about a Koran 
found in the cockpit.” The official adds that “even if it were true, he adds, it would mean 
nothing. It is, after all, hardly an offence.”175 The mention of the “Koran” builds on this 
distorted characterization of terrorists that was established with Perowne’s callback to the 
9/11 attacks. With this scene, McEwan adds in the conventional wisdom that religiosity 
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correlates with violence through irony. The fact that the official has to say that it would 
“hardly” be “an offense” even if a Koran was found is indicative that the public, 
including Perowne, view the Koran as symbolically significant and reaffirming of their 
misperceptions on the kind of people terrorists are.  
 The third scene that primes the readers to picture a terrorist with an Islamic, 
jihadist, Middle Eastern face is when Perowne is driving in between errands, and 
“watches three figures in black burkhas emerge from a taxi.”176 In the excerpt below, he 
describes them and shares his opinions on Muslim customs and tradition:  
“He can’t help his distaste, it’s visceral. How dismal, that anyone should 
be obliged to walk around so entirely obliterated,. At least these ladies 
don’t have the leather beaks. They really turn his stomach. And what 
would the relativists say… That it’s sacred, traditional, a stand against the 
fripperies of Western consumerism? But the men, the husbands—Perowne 
has had dealings with various Saudis in his office—wear suits, or trainers 
and tracksuits, or baggy shorts and Rolexes, and are entirely charming and 
worldly and thoroughly educated in both traditions… He’s caught himself 
in a nascent rant. Let Islamic dress codes be! What should he care about 
burkas? Veils for his irritation. No, irritation is too narrow a word. They… 
serve the gently tilting negative pitch of his mood.”177 
 
This passage is significant because Perowne catches himself othering these women, 
judging the Muslim tradition for being inferior and exasperating in its archaic, gendered 
customs. Though it is not as direct of a connection to terrorism or violence, Perowne’s 
rant hints to the “dramatic oppositional binaries” that the popular narrative is founded on, 
including liberal versus conservative, religious versus secular, and medieval versus 
modern.178 In other words, Perowne paints a polarizing picture of the opposing camps, 
with the free, capitalist and democratic West on one side and the oppressive, constricting 
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doctrine of Islam on the other. The fact that they “[turned] his stomach” showcases that 
the narrative surrounding terrorism and violence is imbued with distorted and negative 
stereotypes of Muslim culture.  The “Us” versus “Them” narrative is so blatantly 
demonstrated, and though he subtly criticizes the patriarchal societal structure, his rant is 
still founded on a religious basis. What is jarring about this scene is that Perowne’s 
“distaste” (even disgust) towards these women is the strongest, most “visceral” reaction 
he has in the entire novel. He does not even express the same level of negative sentiment 
towards Baxter, both when he hits Perowne with his car or when he invades Perowne’s 
home.  
 
Objectives / Motivations 
 As evident in the aforementioned scenes, Perowne—a secular man who practices 
neurosurgery—has a polarized opinion on religion, and he often ruminates on its merit 
and value.  He sees religion not only as antithetical to the scientific explanations that his 
work (and by extension his thought process) is grounded upon; he thinks that religiosity 
is indicative of a mental shortcoming: 
“If Perowne were inclined to religious feeling, to supernatural 
explanations, he could play with the idea that he’s been summoned… He 
should acknowledge a hidden order, an external intelligence which wants 
to show or tell him something of significance… The primitive thinking of 
the supernaturally inclined amounts to what his psychiatric colleagues call 
a problem, or an idea, of reference. An excess of the subjective, the 
ordering of the world in line with your needs, an inability to contemplate 
your own unimportance. In Henry’s view such reasoning belongs on a 
spectrum at whose far end, rearing like an abandoned temple, lies 
psychosis.”179 
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While he acknowledges that religion and faith are extremely influential in informing 
one’s actions, he believes it is a flawed, misguiding way to navigate one’s identity and 
understand one’s purpose. He considers religiosity and faith to be forms of “primitive 
thinking,” “a problem, or an idea of reference,” rather than it being a different (but just as 
valuable) lens in which to look at the world. He goes so far as to say that piety implies 
“an inability to contemplate your own unimportance” and conflates this flawed reasoning 
with “psychosis,” which refers to a set of symptoms of mental illnesses characterized as 
disruptions to a person’s perception that makes it difficult for them to distinguish reality 
from fantasy.180 Coupled with his opinions suggesting that Islam is oppressive, violent, 
and immoral, Perowne’s harsh view on religion compounds the two misconceptions that 
religiosity and mental illness undoubtedly and directly link to violence.  
 
III CHALLENGING MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of the Terrorist  
The terrorist character in this novel is divergent from the terrorists in other novels 
in the sense that he is not a foreign rational from a different country from his opponent or 
captive. The terrorist character in Saturday is Baxter, an English citizen. Technically, 
Baxter is not a terrorist, but a criminal who plans to commit a terrorist act. Initially, when 
he deliberately hits Perowne’s car to get some money and a brawl out of him, he is let off 
as a street thug. However, later on in the novel when he enters the house with Perowne’s 
wife at knifepoint, his goal seems to shift from getting something out of Perowne to 
terrorizing him and his family. McEwan’s layered and multidimensional rendering of a 
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character who is usually depicted as static and flat speaks to his awareness of the 
conventional wisdoms surrounding what—or who—defines a terrorist, and in turn his 
literary ability to dismantle these misperceptions.    
When Perowne first encounters Baxter, he is observant of his physical movements 
and mannerisms. For instance, he notices that “Baxter is unable to initiate or make 
saccades, those flickering changes of eye position from one fixation to another.”181 Based 
on his experience with his patients and his study of medicine, Perowne diagnoses Baxter: 
“A textbook phrase comes to Henry in much the same way as the cantata 
melody—a modest rise in his adrenaline level is making him unusually 
associative. Or the pressures of the past week won’t release him from the 
habits, the intellectual game of diagnosis. The phrase is, a false sense of 
superiority. Yes, it can be down to a slight alteration in character, 
preceding the first tremors, somewhat short of, a little less disabling than, 
those other neurological conditions—grandiosity, delusions of grandeur. 
But he may be mis-remembering. Neurology is not his field…”182 
 
Not only does Perowne assume that Baxter has a mental condition, he uses this 
assumption to try to get himself out of the dangerous situation. Seconds before Baxter 
attempts to assault him, Perowne says to him, “Your father had it. Now you’ve got it 
too.”183 He goes on to deduce that Baxter’s condition has to do with “chromosome four,” 
and that his “misfortune lies with a single gene, in an excessive repeat of a single 
sequence—CAG,” calling it “biological determinism in its purest form.”184  
 This depiction of Baxter’s violence being motivated by a biological mutation or a 
chemical imbalance rather than rational decision-making or personal choice complicates 
his depiction as a terrorist. On one hand, by qualifying his behavior through 
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psychological explanations using medical terminology instead of omitting any sort of 
explanation, McEwan does not leave the readers to think that Baxter is some sadistic 
fanatic who seeks violence solely because it excites him. On the other hand, this 
characterization affirms the conventional wisdom that people who succumb to the use of 
violence (therefore, terrorists) are mentally ill, which is a constraining generalization that 
is damaging to the understanding of terrorists. 
Though there are many conventional wisdoms that are presented and that the 
protagonist acts upon in Saturday, it would be an inaccurate, sweeping generalization to 
say that the insights on terrorism in this novel are distortions from academic theory. Even 
if the readers are not exposed to the terrorists’ thought processes, Henry Perowne reflects 
on terrorism as a phenomenon in general. There are moments when Perowne questions 
his own judgements and evaluates his assumptions:  
Strangely, for all the violence, he almost liked Baxter. That’s to put it too 
strongly. He was intrigued by him, by his hopeless situation, and his refusal to 
give up. And there was a real intelligence there, and dismay that he was living the 
wrong life. And he, Henry, was obliged, or forced, to abuse his own power—but 
he allowed himself to be placed in that position. His attitude was wrong from the 
start, insufficiently defensive; his manner may have seemed pompous, or 
disdainful. Provocative perhaps. He could have been friendlier, even made 
himself accept a cigarette; he should have relaxed, from a position of strength, 
instead of which he was indignant and combative. On the other hand, there were 
three of them, they wanted his cash, they were eager for violence, they were 
planning it before they got out of their car. The loss of a wing mirror was cover 
for a mugging.”185 
 
Similar to Mr Verloc’s reflection on Stevie in The Secret Agent, McEwan uses this 
internal reflection to humanize Baxter through Perowne, who projects sympathy onto 
him. Though the word “intrigued” seems to other Baxter at first, as if he were an animal 
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Perowne was observing, this intrigue comes not so much from his condition, but his 
“intelligence,” his “dismay,” and his “refusal to give up.”  
 
Individual / Personal Motivations 
 In the final 100 pages of Saturday, Baxter and one of his henchmen invade 
Perowne’s house, entering with Perowne’s wife, Rosalind. Perowne “instantly recognizes 
the clothes; the leather jacket, the woollen watch cap,” and realizes that this is the same 
man from the car incident in the morning.186 The fact that Baxter followed Henry 
Perowne to his house to terrorize his family, though disturbing and uncomfortable, seems 
to align with the theory put forth by Corner and Gill regarding mentally ill lone-actor 
terrorists. One of the conclusions they drew from their study was that “lone actors with a 
history of mental illness are more likely associated with single issue ideologies,” rather 
than subscribing to religious inspired or political extremist ideologies.187 In turn, this can 
explain the reason that lone-actors are discriminatory in selecting potential targets.188 It 
seems that even Perowne’s character recognizes the singularity of his purpose; the 
narrator states that “it is, of course, logical that Baxter is here. For a few seconds, 
Perowne’s only thought is stupidly that: of course. It makes sense.”189 Furthermore, they 
concluded that terrorists who hold a single-issue ideology “are more typically fixated 
upon a target that they see as wholly responsible for their grievance.”190 Again, McEwan 
(and by extension, Perowne) recognizes that he himself “is also responsible” in the sense 
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that “he humiliated Baxter in the street in front of his sidekicks,” and as a result “Baxter 
[was] [there] to rescue his reputation in front of a witness.”191 
 McEwan juxtaposes Perowne’s internal thoughts on Islam, the Middle East and 
terrorism with a physical manifestation of terror that is more intimate and literally hits 
close to home. Embedded in this parallel is Simons’ argument that disenfranchised and 
alienated individuals who become terrorists “exist in pockets everywhere, including in 
our own backyard.”192  
 
IV RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT 
Mechanisms to Radicalization 
 Similar to the other narratives, the recruitment process is not given much attention 
in this book, especially because the terrorist in this novel is characterized as acting on his 
mental illness, and therefore operates on his own accord instead of being part of a larger 
system or movement. Perowne speculates that Baxter “is an intelligent man, and gives the 
impression that, illness apart, he’s missed his chances, made some big mistakes and 
ended up in the wrong company.”193 Though not much else is said in relation to Baxter’s 
background, perhaps McEwan is making a point in this omission. As Emily Crenshaw 
had studied, foreign terrorists are depicted in a more negative light than homegrown 
terrorists, and part of this is because the news emphasizes the violent act of the foreign 
terrorist, but gives the homegrown terrorist more personal background and context.194 In 
Saturday, Baxter, while he falls more into the camp of “homegrown terrorist,” receives 
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the same treatment as the “foreign terrorist,” in which his past is omitted from the 
narrative, and all the readers have to judge him on is his present actions.  
 
TAKEAWAYS 
 A nuance that I would like to make more explicit is that even though Baxter is a 
local thug and not a terrorist, his characterization and Perowne’s perception of him serves 
as an analogy for terrorism. Through his creation of Baxter, McEwan highlights that just 
as the motives of a lone-wolf criminal can be broken down and understood, it is possible 
to understand the motivations of international terrorists from foreign organizations if we 
allow them the same effort to understand instead of dehumanize them. Even with 
Perowne’s polarizing, unforgiving political and religious perspective, he made an effort 
to humanize Baxter in spite of what he did.  
Upon first glance, it would seem that Saturday buys into the conventional 
wisdoms, particularly those associated with mental illness, that flatten the 
characterization of the terrorist. Especially with Perowne’s contempt for Saddam, as well 
as his judgments of the Muslim pedestrians/civilians he encounters throughout his 
Saturday, it is easy to read the narrative as one that paints the Westerner as the victim 
turned hero, while casting the terrorist as the undisputed evil villain. But upon a closer 
reading, it is evident that McEwan made some divergent decisions that pushed against 
these conventional wisdoms. And instead of having one character representing the 
conventional wisdoms and another representing their challenges, both sides of the 
narrative mingle and clash within Perowne’s mind. This distinctive formulation of 
McEwan shows that the discourse surrounding terrorism cannot be parcelled out into 
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binaries and sides. Rather, it is a narrative in which contradictory and incompatible 
assumptions and ideas coexist, adapting to the changing times and new circumstances. 
First, he made Baxter a British national, instead of a foreigner, showcasing that even 
people who look like you and live in your community can do awful, violent things. 
McEwan also attributed Baxter’s mental instability to a biological disease, rather than 
religious extremism or the perverse desire for revenge. Finally, McEwan makes readers 
sympathize with Baxter through Perowne himself, and this internal reflection, 
understanding and sympathy culminates in Saturday’s powerful ending, where the victim 
performs surgery on the terrorist to save his life.  
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CHAPTER 6: Terrorist 
 John Updike’s Terrorist is set in New Prospect, a small neighborhood in New 
Jersey, New York, and follows Ahmad Mulloy, an 18 year old Muslim American of Irish 
and Egyptian descent. He goes to his mosque regularly and studies the Qur’an under the 
supervision of his imam, Shaikh Rashid. His guidance counselor, Mr. Jack Levy, notices 
Ahmad for his academic excellence, and convinces him to consider attending college 
after graduation. Based on Shaikh Rashid’s advice, Ahmad wants to become a truck 
driver instead. He is recommended by his imam to the Chehab’s, a Lebanese family who 
sells furniture, and is hired to deliver furniture all over New Jersey. The son of the owner, 
Charlie, rides in the truck with Ahmad to help him with the deliveries. While making one 
delivery, Ahmad discovers that he had delivered a couch that had been stuffed with an 
obscene amount of American dollar bills. Upon telling Charlie what he had seen, Charlie 
and Ahmad develop more trust between one another. Then, Charlie recruits him for a 
suicide mission: to drive a truck loaded with explosives through the Lincoln Bridge in 
order to blow it up. Ahmad agrees to the task.  
However, on the fateful day, he arrives at the checkpoint, and neither Charlie nor 
the other personnel are there to meet him. He walks back to the warehouse where the 
truck is stored, and decides to carry out the mission by himself. As Ahmad approaches 
the Lincoln bridge, he catches sight of Mr. Levy, waving at him from the curb. Mr. Levy 
runs towards the truck and gets inside. Mr. Levy tells Ahmad that Charlie has been 
executed, and that he was a double agent working for the CIA who infiltrated the terrorist 
ranks and used Ahmad to weed out the terrorists. When Ahmad asks Mr. Levy how he 
knows this, Mr. Levy informs him that the sister of his wife works for the Secretary of 
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Homeland Security, and informed Mr. Levy that Ahmad’s distance from his mother and 
involvement in truck driving may be connected. Ahmad tells Mr. Levy to get out of the 
truck so he can carry on with his mission, but Mr. Levy is eventually able to convince 
him to not go through with it. They both drive the truck back to New Prospect.  
 
I HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 In contrast to the other novels investigated in this thesis, the act of terror in 
Terrorist is not based on any specific, real terrorist attack. However, the premise of the 
act in this novel—a bomb placed around a road that people pass through—is quite similar 
to the Boston Marathon bombing that took place on April 15, 2013. On that Monday 
afternoon, two bombs exploded near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three 
people and injuring more than 100.195 The next day, President Obama declares the 
bombings as an “act of terrorism.”196 Three days later, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is found 
covered in blood under the tarp of a boat and is taken into custody.197 It was around a 
month later, on June 24, when he is formally sentenced to death and admits he is guilty, 
and is placed in Supermax prison in Florence, Colorado.198 Dr. Alasdair Conn, the 
hospital’s chief of emergency services of the Massachusetts General Hospital, 
commented that this attack was “like a bomb explosion we hear about in Baghdad or 
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Israel or other tragic points in the world.”199 So, even if Ahmad’s plan to bomb the 
Lincoln bridge was not based on a real attempt, the premise retains its realistic 
construction.  
 
II MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of the Terrorist 
 What is unique to Terrorist in comparison to the other novels studied in this thesis 
is that the theme of religion is very heavy-handed. The first line of the book starts with 
Ahmad thinking to himself, “Devils… These devils seek to take away my God,” referring 
to his classmates.200 And the last line of the book ends in the same vein: “These devils… 
Have taken away my God,” this time referring to the terrorists who had abandoned and 
bailed on the mission.201 Updike is very heavy-handed with conveying Ahmad’s 
religiosity, rendering him the most polarizing character amongst all our terrorists.  
 It seems that Ahmad, until he decides to not go through with the suicide attack, 
fits into the conventional wisdom that “Islamic terrorists are most often vulnerable, weak-
minded… young men who are indoctrinated, groomed, brainwashed or radicalized into 
terrorism, often through extremist madrasas, mosques or internet sites.”202 Ahmad comes 
from a broken household: his “deadbeat” Egyptian father left when he was around three 
years old, and his “hardworking Irish-Catholic” mother does not understand his faith and 
works as a nurses’ aid at a hospital.203 His father’s absence became a point of contention 
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between him and his mother, who Ahmad himself describes as having as “little talent for 
motherhood as a cat. Cats let the kittens suckle for a time and then treat them as enemies. 
I am not yet quite grown enough to be my mother’s enemy, but I am mature enough to be 
an object of indifference.”204 His precarious home situation makes readers believe he is 
“vulnerable” and “weak-minded,” and to an extent allows us to understand why he turns 
to religion. The narrator explains that Ahmad “loves prayer, the sensation of pouring the 
silent voice in his head into a silence waiting at his side, an invisible extension of himself 
into a dimension purer than the three dimensions of this world.”205 
 
Objectives and Motivations 
 If Ahmad’s pronounced religiosity was not enough to play into the conventional 
wisdoms surrounding the popular and distorted terrorist characterization, his contempt 
and disgust for American culture and ideals (coupled with this religiosity) plays right into 
the distorted narrative that academic literature tries to dismantle. It reinforces the 
oppositional binaries of Western versus Islamic, savage versus civilized, medieval versus 
modern, and religious versus secular that permeate the terrorism discourse and give rise 
to the notion that the two sides are incompatible and irreconcilable.206 In a conversation 
with a peer from his high school, Century High, he tells her: “I look around me, and I see 
slaves—slaves to drugs, slaves to fads, slaves to television, slaves to sports heroes that 
don’t know they exist, slaves to the unholy, meaningless opinions of others.”207 The 
fortitude of Ahmad’s religious beliefs, coupled with his disdain for American culture, can 
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be interpreted as an alignment with the conventional wisdom that religiosity is correlated 
to sentiments of hatred, and, by extension, a support for violence as an instrument in 
which this hatred can manifest itself.208  
 
III CHALLENGING MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of Terrorist 
 Another unique element that sets Terrorist apart from the four other novels is that 
the terrorist act takes place (or was planned to take place rather) in the United States. 
When Mr. Levy brings Ahmad into his office and asks about his background, Ahmad 
explains that he is “the product of a white American mother and an Egyptian exchange 
student; they met while both studied at the New Prospect campus of the State University 
of New Jersey.”209 When Mr. Levy asks him if he knows a certain American expression 
that he uses in conversation, Ahmad replies defensively: “Of course, I am not a foreigner. 
I have never been abroad.”210 Similar to Baxter, the terrorist character in Saturday, 
Ahmad represents the challenge to the notion that terrorists come from failed states, and 
shows the readers that terrorism can be bred in nations that are considered to be 
developed, stable and free.211 
 Even though Updike plays into the conventional wisdom that religiosity correlates 
with violence by citing religion as the reason Ahmad decides to carry out the suicide 
mission, Updike flips the script with regards to the conventional wisdom that terrorists 
come from failed states and non-democracies. Ahmad is an American citizen radicalized 
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in one of the most urban areas in the United States. In contrast, Updike presents a foil to 
Ahmad in Mr. Chehab, the owner of the furniture company who Ahmad ends up working 
for. Upon meeting, Mr. Chehab tells Ahmad about his experience in America:  
“America, I don’t understand this hatred. I came here a young man, 
married but my way had to be left behind, just me and my brother, and 
nowhere was there the hatred and shooting of my own countrymen, 
everybody in tribes. Christian, Jew, Arab, indifferent, black, white, in 
between—everybody get along. If you have something good to sell, 
people buy. If you have job to do, people do it. Everything is clear, on 
surface. Makes business easy. From the beginning, no trouble… This is 
honest and friendly country. We still have no problems.” (147)   
 
In paralleling Ahmad and Mr. Chehab, we see that Updike has inverted their 
characterizations. The Middle Eastern foreign national has a fond view of the United 
States and speaks about the nation with gratitude and affection, while the half-white 
American citizen is the one who abhors capitalism and thinks American society to be 
unholy and corrupt. Charlie adds to his father’s characterization, stating that “my father is 
an old-fashioned immigrant, loyal to the system that took him in and let him prosper.”212 
 Finally, Updike addresses the conventional wisdom that terrorists are mentally ill 
in a clever way: Charlie’s nickname for Ahmad is “Madman.”213 This is ironic because 
Ahmad is the furthest from a madman, and is never depicted as being psychologically 
disturbed or abnormal. He is simply (or complexly rather) a religious, well-educated, 
hardworking young adult. The only time madman is not used as a term of endearment is 
when Mr. Levy is trying to convince Ahmad to abandon the suicide mission, telling him 
                                               
212 Updike, Terrorist, 199.  
213 Updike, Terrorist, 153. 
  
Lilles 77 
that if he dies, his mother will “not only lose [him] but she’ll become known as the 
mother of a monster. A madman.”214 
 
Individual / Personal Motivations 
 Although the novel places a lot of emphasis is placed on Ahmad’s piety, that does 
not mean that his religiosity is not conveyed in nuanced ways. There are multiple 
instances throughout Ahmad’s journey that he—as well as others—question and reflect 
on Islam, even if he ultimately agrees to carry out the suicide mission because God willed 
it. For instance, when Mr. Chehab tells Charlie that the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay 
deserved their punishment because they were fighting a war in the name oh jihad, Ahmad 
interjects and says, “Jihad doesn’t have to mean war… It means striving, along the path 
of God. It can mean inner struggle.”215 Ahmad directly speaks against the conventional 
wisdom that Islam is inherently violent and terroristic.  
 When the attacks of 9/11 are brought up in a discussion between Charlie and 
Ahmad, the following dialogue ensues:  
“I pitied them. Especially those that jumped. How terrible, to be so 
trapped by crushing heat that humping to certain death is better. Think of 
the dizziness, looking down before you jump.” 
 “Those people worked in finance, furthering the interests of the 
American empire, the empire that sustains Israel and inflicts death every 
day on Palestinians and Chechnyans, Afghans and Iraqis. In war, pity has 
to be put on hold.” 
 “Many were merely guards and waitresses.” 
 “Serving the empire in their way.” 
 “Some were Muslims.”  
 “Ahmad, you must think of it as a war. War isn’t tidy. There is 
collateral damage.”216 
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Here, the readers glean Ahmad’s compassion for others, which rarely manifests in the 
novel. Although it makes sense for Charlie to hold this view in the context of him being 
undercover, it is both ironic and compelling that the CIA agent would be the one 
dismissing the victims of the attack as simply “furthering the interests” of a violent, cruel 
America, while the terrorist is the one defending them. Through this dialogue, Updike 
shows that Ahmad disagrees with—or at least is unsettled by—the notion of collateral 
damage and indiscriminate violence, which is antithetical to the task and characterization 
of a terrorist. The most striking thing about this passage is that is renders are realistic and 
believable. Rather than two terrorists condemning America or reveling in the 9/11 
attacks, this reads more like a casual conversation between two knowledgeable people, 
debating on the unaccounted costs of war. It his through his outward conversations and 
interactions with people that Ahmad is humanized because the readers are then presented 
with other people to compare him to.  
 The final important scene with regards to motivation is when Ahmad confides in 
Joryleen and tells her about what he thinks of Allah:  
“When I turn to Allah and try to think of Him, it is borne in upon me how 
alone He is, in all the starry space He has willed into existence. In the 
Qur’an, He is called the Loving, the Self-Subsistent. I used to think of the 
love; now I’m struck by the self-subsistence, in all that emptiness. People 
are always thinking of themselves… Nobody thinks of God—if he suffers 
or not, if He likes being what He is. What does He see in the world, to take 
any pleasure in it? And to even think of such things, to try to make such 
pictures of God as a kind of human being, my master the imam would tell 
me was blasphemy, deserving an eternity of Hellfire.”217 
 
Although Ahmad’s religiosity was incredible jarring at the beginning of the novel, it is at 
this point that the strength of his faith is broken down. What this confession shows is that 
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perhaps Ahmad’s anger and willingness to act violently does not stem from any religious 
ideology, but rather from loneliness and isolation. This passage demonstrates what 
Corner and Gill argued in that terrorist motivation has more to do with group dynamics 
than with individual psychology.218 
 
IV RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT  
Mechanisms of Radicalization 
 While Ahmad is depicted as a polarizing character, there are several instances in 
Terrorist when he is ostracized and discriminated, which makes readers engage and 
sympathize with him. His high school peer mentioned earlier, Joryleen, invites him to 
attend mass with her, and he accepts the invitation. Joryleen’s boyfriend, Tylenol, then 
confronts Ahmad about it:  
“Hear you went to church to hear Joryleen sing. How come?” 
“She asked me to.” 
“Shit she did. You’re an Arab. You don’t go there.” 
“I did, though. People were friendly. One family shook my hand and gave 
me big smiles.” 
“They didn’t know about you. You was there under false pretenses.”219 
 
This case of bullying is more severe and sinister because it is laced with ethnic and 
religious prejudice. Tylenol also calls Ahmad a “dumb fuck,” a “weird queer,” a 
“faggot,” a “raghead” and a “shithead.”220 Even though Ahmad did not feel like he 
belonged in American society because it is incongruent to his religious beliefs, he never 
aggressively dehumanized or hostility confronted someone for not sharing his views, as 
Tylenol did to him.  
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 Like the two other post-9/11 novels (Saturday and The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist), Updike alludes to the 9/11 attacks in Terrorist, and talks about how 
Ahmad’s and his family’s life was affected after the attacks. When Mr. Levy shows up at 
the Mulloy residence, he apologizes “for invading [their] privacy” and explains that 
“when [he] tried the phone number on Ahmad’s school records, [he] got a recording 
saying it had been disconnected.”221 Ahmad’s mother, Teresa, then explains that they had 
to disconnect their number after 9/11 because “[they] were getting hate calls. Anti-
Muslim,” and that even when getting the number changed and unlisted “cost a couple 
dollars a month more, it’s worth it.”222 Without putting a face or identity to these 
anonymous callers, Updike showcases how believing in conventional wisdoms can have 
negative effects when they are applied or voiced outward. In this particular scene, the 
misperception that is implicitly highlighted is that there is no possibility of negotiation, 
compromise or appeasement with terrorists because they are fanatical and irrational: the 
only response is deterrence and eradication.223 
 
Recruitment Process 
 It is Ahmad’s imam, Shaikh Rashid, who helps Ahmad secure a job after 
graduating high school. He tells Ahmad that “the mosque has friends, friends as powerful 
as they are pious,” and informs him that “the head of the Chehab family, just the other 
day, told [him] that his prospering business has a need for a young truck driver, with no 
unclean habits and firmly of [their] faith.” Where this novel completely diverges from the 
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distorted narrative and its embedded conventional wisdoms is in the recruitment process 
of Ahmad. Though it is not revealed until the end, Ahmad was recruited into terrorism 
not by a family member or a talent spotter, but by the very CIA double agent operating 
against the terrorists.  
But more than being coworkers, Ahmad finds in Charlie a true friend: “Ahmad is 
grateful to Charlie for including him in the club of male friendship. Fifteen or more years 
older than he, and married though he doesn’t sound it, Charlie seems to assume that 
Ahmad knows everything he knows, or that if not he wants to know it.”224 Just like Stevie 
in The Secret Agent, Ahmad sees Charlie as a mentor who gave him a sense of belonging, 
which translated to being one of the main reasons that Ahmad accepted Charlie’s 
assignment to blow up the Lincoln Bridge.  
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CHAPTER 8: The Reluctant Fundamentalist 
The Reluctant Fundamentalist by Moshin Hamid takes place in a single day, in 
which an American tourist and a Pakistani civilian are having a conversation in a cafe in 
Lahore, Pakistan. Over the course of the novel, the Pakistani, Changez, recounts his 
experiences during his time living in the United States. There are flashbacks and 
reflections on both his individual development (specifically his career growth and his 
relationships) as well as the political climate of the time (9/11, the U.S. bombing 
campaign in Afghanistan, and the Indo-Pakistani conflict). Through drawing parallels 
between his personal experiences and international political events, Changez explains to 
the American his motivations and reasoning for leaving America and how he grew to 
despise it. Although it is never explicitly revealed that he is a terrorist, the novel finishes 
with an open-ended scene in which a few men who are associated with Changez charge at 
the American tourist to either capture or harm him.  
 
I HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 In contrast to the other novels investigated in this thesis, The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist references several terrorist incidents instead of a single one. Changez 
points to three attacks, in all of which the United States had a role or a stake: the 9/11 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the suicide raid of the Indian 
Parliament, and the bombing of Afghanistan. Changez brings up “the bombing of 
Afghanistan” in October of 2001.225 Just a month after the attack on the World Trade 
Center, the United States and Britain “launched a powerful barrage of cruise missiles and 
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long-range bombers against Afghanistan.”226 The two nations “struck at Al Qaeda bases 
and Taliban military installations near several key Afghan cities, including Kabul and 
Kandahar” in attempts to demolish terrorist training camps.227 Twelve days after the 
launch of the bombing campaign—named Operation Enduring Freedom—the first wave 
of conventional ground forces arrived in Afghanistan.228 The war’s early phase was 
comprised of U.S. airstrikes, which were assisted by “a partnership of around 1,000 U.S. 
special forces, the Northern Alliance, and ethnic Pashtun anti-Taliban forces.”229  
Lastly, Changez also mentions that incident when “armed men had assaulted the 
Indian Parliament,” leading him to “[confront] the possibility that soon [his] country 
could be at war.”230 On December 13, 2001, a group of armed men stormed India’s 
parliament complex, killing at least 12 people and injuring 22.231 According to witnesses, 
five intruders stormed the parliament after driving into the complex using a fake pass and 
attacking the security guards manning the entrance.232 One of the intruders died when he 
detonated the explosives strapped to his body, while the other four died in a shootout with 
the police.233 The Indian government blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba for the attack, and 
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demanded that Pakistan halt the militant Islamist group’s activities, imprison its leaders, 
and cut off its financial assets.234  
 
II MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of the Terrorist 
With regards to his physical appearance, Changez is ethnically Pakistani. In the 
opening scene of The Reluctant Fundamentalist, Changez assures the American he is 
conversing with to “not be frightened of [his] beard,” assuring him that he is “a lover of 
America.”235 In terms of physical appearance, the one feature that is constantly referred 
back to is Changez’s beard. This relates to the false assumption that all jihadist terrorists 
are bearded, which is associated with being unkempt and unruly. He mentions it again 
and again, acknowledging that the American’s uneasiness around him may be due to him 
“[drawing] certain conclusions from [his] appearance, [his] lustrous beard.”236 
Changez kept his face clean-shaven while he was working in Financial Services. 
He only started to grow it out after his visit home to Pakistan, which was shortly after the 
events of 9/11, and, later, after the conflict between India and Pakistan started to escalate. 
He explains that the reason he decided to grow it out “was, perhaps, a form of protest on 
[his] part, a symbol of [his] identity, or perhaps [he] sought to remind [himself] of the 
reality [he] had just left behind.”237 
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His beard elicited “verbal abuse by complete strangers” on the New York subway, 
and, at his firm, Underwood Samson, he felt that overnight he had become “a subject of 
whispers and stares.”238 It seems that Changez’ radicalization is attributed to Mechanism 
1 in McCauley and Moskalenko’s pathway chart: Personal victimization. What all of 
these encounters and instances highlight is that in light of both the political climate and 
the change in Changez’s physical appearance, he was othered in a way that he never was 
before. 
Objectives / Motivations 
Changez was subject to discrimination from Americans based on conventional 
wisdoms and false assumptions about Pakistan and Middle Easterners in general. One of 
the most jarring statements came from the father of his ex-girlfriend, while Changez was 
having dinner in their home. When the father asked Changez “how things were” in 
Pakistan, he butts in as Changez is replying and goes off:  
“Economy’s falling apart though, no? Corruption, dictatorship, the rich 
living like princes while everyone else suffers. Solid people, don’t get me 
wrong. I like Pakistanis. But the elite has raped that place well and good, 
right? And fundamentalism. You guys have got serious problems with 
fundamentalism.”239 
  
The assumption here that Erica’s father holds to be true is that terrorists are born out of 
economic instability and social unrest. Through the father, Hamid showcases the 
conventional wisdom that Anna Simons addresses, which is that failed states breed 
terrorism. He brings up mechanisms of instability like “corruption” and “dictatorship,” 
and also highlights the deep disparity in wealth. He tries to dilute his judgement by 
inserting that he “[likes] Pakistanis,” but then follows by using a violent, vulgar word, 
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“rape” to criticize the elite. This stance is inappropriate at the very least, particularly 
because this is his first time meeting Changez. Erica’s father’s tone is blunt and harsh, 
and the questions are not questions at all, but judgements with inflections at the end 
(“no?” and “right?), which makes them all the more condescending.  
 
III CHALLENGING MISCONCEPTIONS 
Characterization of Terrorist  
 While Changez is of Pakistani descent, he spent most of his adult life in the 
United States. He “worked in New York, and before that attended college in New 
Jersey,” at Princeton.240 His opportunity to both study and work in the United States is 
indicative of his high class and status. He blatantly states that he is “not poor; far from 
it… My grandfather and father both attended university in England. Our family home sits 
on an acre of land in the middle of Gulberg, one of the most expensive districts of this 
city. We employ several servants, including a driver and a gardener—which would, in 
America, imply that we were a family of great wealth.”241 Right off the bat, Hamid 
already breaks down two main conventional wisdoms and shows that terrorists are not 
always individuals who are uneducated or come from severe poverty. Not only did his 
family own a lot of land and have a house staff, they left their homes to study abroad. In 
other words, Changez is hardly fits the impoverished, uneducated foreigner that people 
assume a terrorist, specifically a fundamentalist terrorist, to be. Through Changez, Hamid 
showcases the counterargument to the poverty misperception, as his main character is 
consistent with the academic findings suggesting that those “with higher educational 
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attainment and higher living standards are more likely to participate in terrorist 
activity.242 Changez’s complexity and nuance as the terrorist or “antagonist” in this story 
is derived from the fact that he was, as he puts it, “the product of an American university” 
who “was earning a lucrative American salary” and “was infatuated with an American 
woman.”243 He was a product of a physical, educational, and emotional immersion in 
American experiences, values and ideals.  
 Perhaps the most important and unusual element of the novel that leads to this 
holistic characterization of Changez is the fact that he is the narrator of this story. The 
Reluctant Fundamentalist is written in first person, and so the audience has no choice but 
to listen to the perspective of the “villain” or “antagonist.” Because the terrorist is the 
narrator, the story is filtered through his own judgments, opinions, and values, allowing 
the reader to follow his logic and sympathize with his desires and goals rather than 
discard them and apply our own. What is more interesting is that the American tourist, 
who would have been considered the “protagonist” or the “hero” in most other stories, is 
not given any opportunity to speak in terms of dialogue. The only narrative we receive 
from the American is through Changez noticing his physical body language and facial 
expressions in response to their surroundings and Changez’s story. This is an incredible 
reversal, because now it is the Westerner that is scrutinized solely based on visible 
actions and superficial expressions. By excluding the voice of the opposition, Hamid flips 
the common trope portrayed by the media and by policy and pushes the readers to invest 
in the story of the terrorist narrator.  
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Individual / Personal Motivations 
 In the first half of the novel, Changez talks about his time in America with 
fondness and nostalgia. With regard to his college career at Princeton, he emphasizes the 
welcoming environment: “Students like me were given visas and scholarships, complete 
financial aid, mind you, and invited into the ranks of meritocracy. In return, we were 
expected to contribute our talents to your society, the society we were joining. And for 
the most part, we were happy to do so. I certainly was, at least at first.”244 However, that 
does not mean that he was not confronted with stark contrasts in culture and custom that 
made him think about his identity or his place in the United States as a Pakistani man. 
Even with his American education and prestigious job, Changez was othered and 
discriminated against.  
 
Act of Terror 
As Changez walks his American companion back to his hotel, he notices that the 
American is concerned about the three men following behind them. Changez comments 
that one of the men was their waiter from the restaurant, and at one point he “offered 
[Changez] a nod of recognition.”245 The very last line of the novel confirms the 
cooperation between Changez and these men, as Changez tells the American, “Yes, he is 
waving at me to detain you.”246 Although this is the closest the readers get to a 
confirmation that Changez is a terrorist, Hamid complicates the narrative by making him 
operate under an organization and a system, rather than depicting him as a lone wolf who 
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decided to harm Americans out of revenge for the discrimination he faced in the United 
States. With regard to individual radicalization via personal victimization, McCauley and 
Moskalenko state that “personal grievance is unlikely to account for group sacrifice 
unless the personal is framed and interpreted as representative of group grievance.”247  
In relation to the novel finishing with an open-ended cliffhanger, it is important to 
note that the words “terrorist” and “terrorism” never show up in this novel. The only 
indicate we get that Changez is a terrorist is his implicit resentment towards America, his 
command at the end, and the title of the novel. As Richard Jackson explains, “terms like 
‘extremist’ and ‘fundamentalist’ obscure the fact that Islamist groups engage in an array 
of political, social and cultural activities, few of which could be described as radical.”248 
Given how weighted the word is, its omission could be a deliberate decision of Hamid to 
get the readers thinking about why they consider Changez to be a terrorist and on what 
grounds he should be labelled as such, especially when the novel ends before we find out 
whether he commits a terrorist act at all.  
 
IV RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT 
Mechanisms to Radicalization  
While it is difficult to pinpoint the beginning of Changez’ radicalization, it is clear 
that it was a gradual process that came with observations of how simultaneously 
prestigious and advanced, yet detached and elitist America and its people are compared to 
their less developed counterparts. Throughout the novel, Changez juxtaposes the West 
and the East with regard to lifestyle, culture, and ideals. As Crenshaw states, terrorism is 
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seen as legitimate and justified when a terrorist perceives his enemy—in this case, the 
United States—as unjust, morally corrupt, and violent.249  
One of the first instances of this is when Changez talks about the attitudes of his 
American college peers regarding wealth. He was “annoyed” by “the ease at which they 
parted with money” or “their self-righteousness with dealing with those whom they had 
paid for a service,” all the while wondering why his peers “[conducted] themselves in the 
world as though they were its ruling class.”250 Even though Changez himself belonged to 
the wealthy class, he viewed the American attitude towards wealth as excessive and 
lavish, and an indicator of superiority. This view is attached to the United States as a 
country, with other nations characterizing it as having a superiority complex, especially 
in its role on the international stage as the hegemon and superpower.  
 The catalyzing event in the novel that results in the revealing of Changez’s 
contempt for America is the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He relays his reaction to the tragedy in 
all sincerity: “I started as one—and then the other—of the twin towers of New York’s 
World Trade Center collapsed. And then I smiled. Yes, despicable as it may sound, my 
initial reaction was to be remarkably pleased.”251 To attach positive diction like “smiled” 
and “pleased” to something as terrible as the events of 9/11 seems to be completely 
irrational and cruel. However, Changez expands on this position and elaborates why he 
felt that way:  
“… Please believe me when I tell you that I am no sociopath; I am not 
indifferent to the suffering of others… So when I tell you I was pleased at 
the slaughter of thousands of innocents, I do so with a profound sense of 
perplexity. But at that moment, my thoughts were not with the victims of 
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the attack… no, I was caught up in the symbolism of it all, the fact that 
someone had so visibly brought America to her knees.”252 
 
Changez’s confession showcases the complete disconnect between himself and the 
United States, a nation with which he used to so deeply identify. This goes back to Wilner 
and Dubouloz, and shows how the extreme societal division into different religious and 
cultural groups “weakens the bonds of state identity, civil association, and 
nationalism.”253 As time passes, and especially in Changez’ case, when international 
events exacerbate these cleavages in society, the alienated individual starts to characterize 
the broader community he/she lives in as the enemy.254 In this passage, Hamid italicizes 
victims to show that Changez does not see the innocent employees in the World Trade 
Center buildings as the victims. Rather, he considers himself the victim of America’s 
discrimination and xenophobia against him and people similar to him. He also comments 
on America’s reaction to the attacks and how they othered Changez even further: 
“Your country’s flag invaded New York after the attacks; it was 
everywhere… They all seemed to proclaim: We are America—not New 
York, which, in my opinion, means something quite different—the 
mightiest civilization the world has ever known; you have slighted us; 
beware our wrath.”255 
 
Emily Crenshaw points out this particular display of nationalism post 9/11 and how this 
exacerbated othering. She cites that after the attacks, “American television news reporters 
across the country wore American flag lapel pins, draped studio sets with flags and 
banners and repeatedly showed footage of three firefighters raising the flag over the 
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Ground Zero rubble.”256 This saturation of patriotism and nationalism in news coverage 
exacerbates bias and dilutes the sociopolitical complexity of terrorism.257 This 
“nationwide reaffirmation”and “emphasis on state strength” only reifies the “Us” versus 
“Them” narrative.258 McCauley and Moskalenko point out that individuals who feel 
personally victimized do not move to violence unless they perceive their victimization as 
joined to the victimization of their ethnic or national group.259  
 At first, Changez’s contempt for America, especially after it had suffered a 
violent, brutal attack on its people, seems callous and heartless. But as the novel 
continues, Changez presents the readers with two other events—the bombings in 
Afghanistan and the attack on Indian parliament—in which America was no longer the 
victim, but, respectively, the perpetrator and the passive bystander:  
“I had chanced upon a newscast with ghostly night-vision images of 
American troops dropping into Afghanistan for what was described as a 
daring raid on a Taliban command post. My reaction caught me by 
surprise; Afghanistan was Pakistan’s neighbor, our friend, and a fellow 
Muslim nation besides, and the sight of what I took to be the beginning of 
its invasion by your countrymen caused me to tremble with fury.”260 
 
Changez characterizing America as “ghostly” troops “[raiding]” and “[invading]” while 
depicting Afghanistan as the “neighbor,” “friend” and “fellow Muslim nation,” he flips 
the narrative that readers had internalized through 9/11. The parallel that is drawn 
between these two events conveys important commentary in terms of who we consider to 
be terrorists, and that this identification may be grounded upon factors other than the 
indiscriminate use of violence. In his announcement of the bombing campaign, President 
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Bush alluded to the 9/11 attacks and voiced a warning to nations sponsoring terrorist 
organizations, stating that governments who protect “outlaws and killers of innocents” 
will “take that lonely path at their own peril.”261 Changez describes that “I was a modern-
day janissary, a servant of the American empire at a time when it was invading a country 
with a kinship to mine that was perhaps even colluding to ensure that my own country 
faced the threat of war.”262 This goes with Tessler and Robbins finding that it is not 
religious involvement or negative views of Western culture that make individuals more 
likely to approve of terrorist acts against U.S. targets, but rather negative views about the 
foreign policy of the United States.263 Changez’s anger and frustration stemming from 
these events goes to show that his radicalization may not just stem from his personal 
victimization as an individual Pakistani national, but also political grievance.  
 
Recruitment Process 
 Although it is not clear how Changez was recruited into his terrorist organization, 
one can gather some insight as to his role in the organization from the details mentioned 
in the novel. When Changez returns to Pakistan, he becomes a university lecturer. Martha 
Crenshaw argues that many terrorists come from a background of political experience in 
which they operated in nonviolent opposition to the state.264 Changez, who referred 
himself to a “believer in non-violence,” used his education platform to advocate for the 
“disengagement from [America] by [Pakistan],” as well as to “persuade [his students] of 
the merits of participating in demonstrations for greater independence in Pakistan’s 
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domestic and international affairs.”265  Changez would tell his students that “no country 
inflicts death so readily upon the inhabitants of other countries, frightens so many people 
so far away, as America.”266 He mentions that these peaceful demonstrations would later 
be labeled as “anti-American” by the foreign press.267 
  
TAKEAWAYS 
 What makes The Reluctant Fundamentalist innovative in its unconventionality is 
that it gives the terrorist not only a prominent voice, but the absolute power to control the 
narrative. It is true that the terrorist voice is included in the academic and political realms 
through interviews with terrorists for the former and recruitment videos and statements 
from terrorist leaders for the latter. But for the academic realm, their voices are still 
primed and filtered by the types of questions they are asked. And for the political realm, 
their messaging is so curated, and is geared to play into the conventional wisdoms in 
order to affirm—and therefore enhance—the public’s fear. But The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist takes the time to outline who the terrorist was prior to radicalization and 
recruitment, exploring the shifts in his beliefs and values rather than stewing on the 
atrocity of his actions.  
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CHAPTER 9: THE INTENTION-PERCEPTION CYCLE 
 After the analysis of the depiction of the individual terrorist in the novel and its 
comparison to academic theory, this final category will discuss how this depiction relates 
back to the public perception of the terrorist. The “Intention-Perception Cycle” aims to 
target the second part of the question this thesis addresses: what insights can we take 
away from this comparison? An important theme that all novels explore is how the 
public’s perception of terrorism compares to the true intentions of the terrorist, and how 
these two sides inform and affect each other.  
A lot of the academic theory criticizes the media and governments alike for their 
dehumanization and othering of the terrorists as well as their aggressive responses to 
spectacle and terror. The west, particularly Britain and the United States, use the 
terrorism discourse (particularly Islamic terrorism) to “legitimize or sell a range of 
international and domestic political projects,” such as regime change in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, increased military presence in certain regions (Central Asia), increase in resources 
and power for their governments’ military arms, and the preservation of a liberal, 
Western-dominated international order in general.268 And it is exactly these distorted 
“narratives of fanatical, murderous, suicidal ‘Islamic terrorists’ functions to amplify 
rather than ally the social gear generated by terrorist actions because it reinforces the 
perception that the attackers are inhuman killing machines who cannot be deterred or 
reasoned with.”269 
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However, those who are against terrorism are not the only ones at fault for 
pushing this distorted narrative. Terrorists capitalize on these responses, relying on their 
dehumanization and othering in order to be perceived as unpredictable, alien, and 
unknown. As Martha Crenshaw puts it, “violence and bloodshed always excite human 
curiosity, and the theatricality, suspense, and threat of danger inherent in terrorism 
enhance its attention-getting qualities.”270 Though terrorists are simply people with 
agendas and operate differently to achieve those agendas, they understand that the best 
way to get attention is to act monstrously, making themselves seem more terrifying, and 
thus obtaining more power and leverage. Consequently, this capitalization perpetuates the 
public’s one-dimensional, skewed perception, and the resulting cycle is what the 
functionality of terrorism depends on. Now, this is where the role of the novel comes in. 
The novelist has the power to break this cycle, to rehumanize the people who have not 
only been dehumanized, but who rely on this dehumanization in order to be successful in 
their terrorist acts.  
This relationship between the public perception of the terrorist and the terrorist’s 
“true” characterization is less of a dichotomy, and more of a cycle or feedback loop, with 
the two sides fueling the other’s contempt and prejudice to the point that neither side 
would ever consider attempting to understand the other. The authors of these six novels 
are acutely aware of this dynamic and—whether it is to express their own rage or 
frustration or to show that people are not monstrous though their methods may be—use 
their writing to embark on the endeavor to rehumanize what has been so blatantly and 
successfully alienated and othered.  
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The Secret Agent 
One of the most prominent themes Conrad highlights that link back to the 
intention-perception cycle is the theme of spectacular violence. He channels this theme 
primarily through Mr. Vladimir, who talks at length to Mr. Verloc about selecting what 
building/structure should be bombed to garner the most visceral, horrified reaction from 
the public. He muses on how the target must not any common establishment:  
“A murderous attempt on a restaurant or theatre would suffer in the same 
way from the suggestion of non-political passion: the exasperation of a 
hungry man, an act of social revenge. All this is used up; it is no longer 
instructive as an object lesson in revolutionary anarchism. Every 
newspaper has ready-made phrases to explain such manifestations 
away.”271 
 
Here, Mr. Vladimir essentially renders the bombing of common establishments 
ineffective because the intention is left to the interpretation of the media (implied by 
“every newspaper”) and by extension, the public. Instead of these acts of violence being 
spectacular in their terror, they are now dismissed as a mere “act of social revenge” rather 
than being a clear, powerful message showcasing “revolutionary anarchism.” Through 
Mr. Vladimir, Conrad accentuates that terrorists are very much aware that their true 
motivations are being severely distorted by the people they target and victimize. In this 
excerpt Conrad also presents an explicit commentary on the oversaturation—and the 
resulting monotony—of spectacular violence in the public’s psyche. As more and more 
of these acts occur, their disarming, disturbing effect is reduced. Once they are “used up,” 
the public becomes desensitized to the violence, and “explain such [incidents] away” 
instead of actively responding to them. This numbness has a tremendous effect on the 
intention-perception cycle. As the target population become less reactive and more 
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apathetic, the more terrorists organizations will lean towards more barbaric, brutal acts of 
indiscriminate violence.  
 Finally, Mr. Vladimir does directly address the problem of dehumanization, but 
from a different angle:  
“But what is one to say to an act of destructive ferocity so absurd as to be 
incomprehensible, inexplicable, almost unthinkable; in fact, mad? 
Madness alone is truly terrifying, inasmuch as you cannot placate it either 
by threats, persuasion, or bribes. Moreover, I am a civilised man. I would 
never dream of directing you to organise a mere butchery, even if I 
expected the best results from it. But I wouldn’t expect from a butchery 
the result I want. Murder is always with us. It is almost an institution. The 
demonstration must be against learning—science… The attack must have 
all the shocking senselessness of gratuitous blasphemy.” (27) 
 
This is where Conrad speaks directly to the dehumanization of terrorists by simply 
labelling them as “mad” or insane. Because Mr. Verloc and Mr. Vladimir are part of a 
regime that is committing a terrorist act and are not terrorists themselves, the plan was for 
the bomb to destroy part of the Observatory, but with the intention of not harming very 
many people. Mr. Vladimir qualifies this intention by calling himself “civilised,” and that 
“a mere butchery” or indiscriminate murder of people would in turn lead the public to 
dismiss the gravity of the act on the grounds of the “madness” of the perpetrator. 
Furthermore, he explains here that science has superseded art and religion as the field that 
society values and looks toward to explain why the world works the way it works, and 
pinpoints this as evidence for his hypothesis that the public will be up in arms if the 
Observatory is bombed. Mr. Vladimir’s calculating reflects show that the terrorist takes 
the public perspective into account, and plans his actions—his targets, his weapons, his 
timing, and everything else—with this perspective in mind in order to get the response he 
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desires. I can’t put it better than Mr. Vladimir: “The only thing that matters to us is the 
emotional state of the masses. Without emotion there is no action.”272 
 
 The intention-perception cycle is also alluded to when the Professor is speaking to 
Ossipon about people’s perception of him:  
“It is character alone that makes for one’s safety… Force of personality… 
I have the means to make myself deadly, but that by itself, you understand, 
is absolutely nothing in the way of protection. What is effective is the 
belief those people have in my will to use the means. That’s their 
impression. It is absolute. Therefore I am deadly.”273 
 
What the Professor implies here is that the power and leverage terrorists have comes from 
their resolve to use brutal and indiscriminate methods of violence to promote their 
ideology or achieve their political objective. And this resolve is not derived from the 
structure of the terrorist organization, the lethality of their weapons or the tenets of their 
ideology, though these factors certainly strengthen it. But resolve is directly linked to 
character, and ultimately, this comes from the individual terrorists themselves. 
Ultimately, it is not “the means” that make terrorists deadly, but the belief in their “will to 
use the means.” In the particular case of The Secret Agent, the bomb in itself generates 
fear, but it is the fact that it represents the intentions of the terrorists and their will to use 
harmful means that makes the weapon even more terrifying.  
When Ossipon pushes back and tells the Professor that other people have that 
“force of personality,” the Professor challenges him and argues that “it is a matter of 
degree,” and that other people’s characters are “built upon conventional morality” and 
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“leans on the social order,” while his ideology “stands free from everything artificial.”274 
As an end to the conversation, the Professor finishes by stating that while others “depend 
on life, which… is a historical fact surrounded by all sorts of restraints and 
considerations, a complex organized fact open to attack at every point,” he “[depends] on 
death, which knows no restraint and cannot be attacked. My superiority is evident.”275 
This commentary again links back to terrorists using unconventional methods of violence 
that governments are prohibited from exercising because of the laws and constraints they 
are bound to (especially democratic regimes). 
 
Mao II 
DeLillo addresses the relationship between public perception and terrorist motivations in 
a unique way: He draws a parallel between the terrorist and the novelist.  
“There’s a curious knot that binds novelists and terrorists. In the west we 
become famous effigies as our books lose the power to shape and 
influence… Years ago I used to think it was possible for a novelist to alter 
the inner life of the culture. Now bomb-makers and gunmen have taken 
that territory. They make raids on human consciousness. What writers 
used to do before we were all incorporated.”276 
 
Through Bill Gray’s commentary, DeLillo emphasizes that terrorists and novelists are 
both “shapers of sensibility and thought,” but that they are competing forces, in which the 
terrorists’ “degree to which they influence mass consciousness is the extent of [the 
novelists’] decline.”  
DeLillo’s rendering of this theme links back to the utility of fiction to influence 
public opinion by conveying relevant and topical ideas, questions, and discussions in a 
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simultaneously accessible and innovative way. The ability of the novelist “to alter the 
inner life of the culture” is the premise that this thesis is founded upon, and is the reason I 
chose to explore the topic of terrorism through fiction in the first place. An interesting 
thing to note is that this opposes the argument expressed in The Secret Agent, when Mr. 
Vladimir states that “nobody minds what [artists] say.”277 DeLillo asserts that artists 
perspectives did matter, but that the spectacular and unbelievable nature of terrorism has 
superseded that of fiction.   
One of the most unique themes that DeLillo brings up again and again in Mao II 
is the parallel between the terrorist and the novelist. This parallel is also hinted at in Ian 
McEwan’s Saturday. And it is in this parallel that we get a better grasp of the 
conventional wisdoms. By comparing the intentions of terrorists to those of novelists, 
DeLillo demonstrates how both work to incite strong, intense emotions in their audience 
by making the impossible and incredulous believable. When Charles and Gray discuss 
the hostage crisis, and frustration is expressed about the indiscriminate nature of the 
kidnappings, Charles responds: 
“Of course he’s innocent. That’s why they took him. It’s such a simple 
idea. Terrorize the innocent. The more heartless they are, the better we see 
their rage. And isn’t it the novelist, Bill, above all people, above all 
writers, who understands this rage, who knows in his soul what the 
terrorist thinks and feels? Through history it’s the novelist who has felt the 
affinity for the violent man who lives in the dark. Where are your 
sympathies? With the colonial police, the occupier, the rich landlord, the 
corrupt government, the militaristic state? Or with the terrorist? And I 
don’t abjure that word even if it has a hundred meanings. It’s the only 
honest word to use.” 
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Oversimplifying the group’s cause to “[terrorizing] the innocent,” and associating their 
intentions with words like “heartless” and “rage” plays right into the assumption that 
terrorists are vengeful, irrational, and inhuman.  
 Don DeLillo only gives the readers a window into the intention of the hostage-
taking in the last scene of the book, where Brita, the photojournalist, goes to Beirut to 
interview Abu Rashid, the leader of the terrorist organization. The interpreter explains: 
“I will tell you why we put Westerners in locked rooms. So we don’t have 
to look at them. They remind us of the way we tried to mimic the West. 
The way we put up the pretense, the terrible veneer. Which you now see 
has exploded all around you… As long as there is a Western presence, it is 
a threat to self-respect, to identity… Terror is what we use to give our 
people their place in the world. What used to be achieved through work, 
we gain through terror. Terror makes the new future possible. All men one 
man. Men live in history as never before.”278 
 
Here, one can see that the terrorist has internalized the same “Us” versus “Them” binary 
that the West uses to antagonize terrorists.279 The terrorist is aware that his people were 
considered inferior, so inferior that they “tried to mimic the West” and aspire to its values 
and ideals. The anti-Western sentiment relayed in this passage not only parallels, but 
seems to respond to the West’s distorted, negative sentiments on the Middle East in 
general.  
In direct reference to the intention-perception cycle, Charles tells Gray that the 
terrorists have the monopoly not only on the narrative of fear, violence, mystery, and thus 
public attention:  
“The way they live in the shadows, live willingly death. The way they hate 
many of the things you hate. Their discipline and cunning. The coherence 
of their lives. The way they excite, they excite admiration. In societies 
reduced to blur and glut, terror is the only meaningful act… Inertia-
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hysteria. Is history possible? Is anyone serious? Who do we take 
seriously? Only the lethal believer, the persona who kill and dies for faith. 
Everything else is absorbed. The artist is absorbed, the madman in the 
street is absorbed and processed and incorporated. Only the terrorist stands 
outside. The culture hasn’t figured out how to assimilate him. It’s 
confusing when they kill the innocent. But this is precisely the language of 
being noticed, the only language the West understands. The way they 
determine how we see them. The way they dominate the rush of endless 
streaming images.”280 
 
Going back to Mr. Verloc’s statement that action is nothing without emotion, Charles 
echoes this idea and recognizes that the terrorists “excite” the public because how they 
fight and what they fight for “stands outside” the normal undertakings of modern 
society.But even with this argument that terrorists have taken power away from the 
novelists, Gray still insists that he believes in the novel because “it’s a democratic shout,” 
asserting that “anybody can write a great novel… The spray of talent, the spray of ideas. 
One thing unlike another, one voice unlike the next. Ambiguities, contradictions, 
whispers, hints.”281 It seems that Gray sees the power that he has to break the intention-
perception cycle.  
 
Saturday 
While the depiction of terrorism in Saturday takes the form of analogy, inference, 
and underhanded associations, McEwan does give the readers a protagonist who is 
acutely self-aware of his place in the intention-perception cycle, and reflects on his 
position as his day progresses. Throughout the novel, Perowne often thinks critically 
about his opinions and reflects on the biases and assumptions that his judgements 
harness. With regards to the crashing plane, Perowne realizes that as he anticipates more 
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news about the incident, he subconsciously forms a narrative on his own and imagines his 
own reasons and consequences for the situation:  
“Misunderstanding is general all over the world. How can we trust 
ourselves? [Perowne] sees now the details he half-ignored in order to 
nourish his fears: that the plan was not being driven into a public building, 
that it was making a regular, controlled descent, that it was on a well-used 
flight path—none of this fitted the general unease.”282 
 
Perowne admits that he thinks of the worse case scenarios “in order to nourish his fears,” 
and this points to the intention-perception cycle in the sense that the public responds to 
fear more than anything else, to an extent that they even anticipate and expect terror. It 
seems that McEwan is implicitly asserting that to humanize a terrorist—to give their 
horrendous actions justification and perspective—would be divergent from the “general 
unease” and the current, popular narrative. But Perowne recognizes that his nascent 
expectation for the plane crash to be an attempt at a terrorist act rather than an engine 
malfunction is indeed a “misunderstanding,” and even questions whether we, as people, 
can “trust ourselves” with searching for the narrative that is true, even if we do not agree 
with it or it does not fulfill our expectations.  
 This questions pervades through the novel, and culminates into this final 
reflection before Perowne’s daughter, father-in-law and son arrive for the dinner:  
“Does [Perowne] think he’s contributing to something, watching news 
programmes, or lying on his back on the sofa on Sunday afternoons, 
reading more opinion columns of ungrounded certainties, more long 
articles about what really lies behind this or that development, or about 
what is most surely going to happen next, predictions forgotten as soon as 
they are read, well before events disprove them? For or against the war on 
terror, or the war in Iraq; for the termination of an odious tyrant and his 
crime family, for the ultimate weapons inspection, the opening of torture 
prisons, locating the mass graves, the chance of liberty and prosperity, and 
a warning to other despots; or against the bombing of civilians, the 
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inevitable refugees and famine, illegal international action, the wrath of 
Arab nations and the swelling of Al-Qaeda’s ranks. Either way, it amounts 
to a consensus of a kind, an orthodoxy of attention, a mild subjugation in 
itself. Does he think that his ambivalence—if that’s what it really is—
excuses him from the general conformity?”283 
 
The question that McEwan presents here with regards to the intention-perception cycle is 
whether it is enough for someone to recognize and acknowledge that the cycle exists, but 
do nothing to break it. Clearly Perowne is aware that he is being presented with several 
narratives that both support and challenge, reaffirm and undermine, expand on and 
contradict one another. But he wonders whether understanding that there is more than one 
narrative is sufficient, or whether his self-aware “ambivalence” makes him complicit in 
perpetuating this cycle of distortion and misunderstanding. Especially with regards to the 
war on terror and the war in Iraq, the government will always be offering up a narrative 
that leads the public to align with the administration’s policy, and while public buy-in is 
an essential factor to successful foreign policy, this means that the government can 
manipulate the narrative in order to get the public on board with their policy. What 
Perowne ponders—and by extension what the readers are forced to confront—is if, upon 
recognizing this manipulation, one should speak up against it.    
 Something that is fascinating about Saturday is that McEwan, like DeLillo in Mao 
II, also addresses the role of fiction and literature in conveying the ideas, events, and 
conundrums of the real world. At one point, Perowne internally comments on the book 
recommendations given to him by his daughter:  
“So far, Daisy’s reading lists have persuaded him that fiction is too 
humanly flawed, too sprawling and hit-and-miss to inspire uncomplicated 
wonder at the magnificence of human ingenuity of the impossible 
dazzlingly achieved… Work that you cannot begin to imagine achieving 
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yourself, that displays a ruthless, nearly inhuman element of self-enclosed 
perfection—this is his idea of genius. This notion of Daisy’s, that people 
can’t “live” without stories, is simply not true. He is living proof.”284 
 
Surprisingly, Perowne’s view on the effectiveness of fiction as conveyed in this passage 
opposes the view presented in the other novels, which highlight the value of fiction to 
break the intention-perception cycle by providing an alternative narrative. He considers 
himself an example of someone who is satisfied with the confines and “magnificence” of 
the real world, and does not see the utility in made-up stories or the value in imagining 
other worlds. What is ironic about his argument is that it is Daisy’s recitation of a poem 
that calms Baxter down when he invades the Perowne residence, giving Perowne and his 
son Theo the opportunity to work together to take him down. His perspective is based on 
the argument that fiction is too “humanly flawed,” but that is exactly what makes it 
useful: fiction not only emphasizes the vulnerabilities and flaws in the human condition, 
but highlights that every single existing person are subject to these same vulnerabilities in 
one way or another.  
Terrorist 
 What is interesting about the exploration of the intention-perception cycle in 
Terrorist is that the conversations about this cycle are neither directed at nor actively 
involve the terrorist and protagonist, Ahmad, himself. Updike uses secondary characters 
to illustrate the cycle, specifically through conversations between Charlie and Mr. 
Chehab as well as discussions between the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
Hermione.  
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In one scene, Mr. Chehab argues with Charlie about how imprisonment and 
punishment in America is nothing compared to the rest of the world, to which Charlie 
disagrees. Within this argument, Charlie brings up the terrorist suspects that are held in 
Guantanamo Bay: “What about our little concentration camp down at Guantanamo Bay? 
Those poor bastards can’t even have lawyers. They can’t even get imams who aren’t 
snitches.”285 Charlie alludes to the dehumanization of terrorists under the custody of 
counterterrorist forces like the United States government, and how this punishment strips 
terrorists of their rights and liberties as human beings. To this, Mr. Chehab responds:  
“They are enemy soldiers… They are dangerous men. They wish to 
destroy America. That is what they say to reporters, even though they are 
better fed by us than ever by the Taliban. They think Nine-Eleven was a 
great joke. It is war for them. It is jihad. That is what they say to 
themselves. What they expect, Americans to lie down flat under feet and 
make no self-defense? Even bin Laden, he expects being fought back.”286 
 
Mr. Chehab’s response highlights that one’s ethnicity, nationality and religion has no 
relation or connection to one’s opinion on using violence or supporting terrorism. Mr. 
Chehab is a Muslim who grew up in Lebanon before moving to America, but has the 
same view—albeit a distorted one—of terrorists that is prominent in America’s zeitgeist. 
Even though he shares the same religion as the prisoners, he sees them as the “enemy,” 
branding them as “dangerous men” who essentially asked for this dehumanizing 
treatment because of the atrocious acts they committed. In short, Mr. Chehab argues that 
the cruelty and indignity that comes with imprisonment is expected because the terrorists 
are the ones who waged “war” as their duty to “jihad.” It seems that Updike swaps the 
perspectives of these two characters: the undercover American CIA agent is defending 
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the terrorists, while the Muslim foreign national denounces them. Ahmad is present when 
this conversation takes place, although neither he nor the narrator (and by extension, 
Updike himself) aligns with one side over the other. Perhaps Updike is shedding light on 
the idea that the two sides of the intention-perception cycle are not separated by the 
identity binaries that have been assumed to apply to the terrorism discourse in general.  
While it is not integral to the main plot, there is one small scene between the 
Secretary of Homeland Security and Hermione that directly speaks to the intention-
perception cycle. They have been discussing how the department should deal with a 
terrorist threat, and the Secretary says: “My trouble is… I love this damn country so 
much I can’t imagine why anybody would want to bring it down. What do these people 
have to offer instead? More Taliban—more oppression of women, more blowing up 
statues of Buddha.”287 The Secretary embodies the perspective of the public (the 
American public in this particular case), baffled by the notion that terrorists—anybody 
for that matter—would want to destroy the United States and everything that it stands for, 
especially when the societies that terrorists would build if they had the chance to would 
be much worse of than American society. He puts terrorists on a lower, more inferior 
level, arguing that all they are good for is oppressing women, blowing up statues, and 
killing their own children. This primitive, barbaric depiction of terrorists shows the 
dehumanization that occurs on the side of the public. In response to this, Hermione 
presents the other side of the argument: “They fear losing something, something precious 
to them… So precious they will sacrifice their own children to it. It happens in this 
country too. The marginal sects, where some charismatic leader seals them off from 
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common sense.”288 What Hermione highlights is that even though terrorists have different 
goals and different means of achieving those goals, they operate on the same desire to 
preserve (and fight) for the things that matter to them, emphasizing that the United States 
also uses extreme means to achieve its objectives.  
 A final comment made in Terrorist that addresses the intention-perception cycle 
is when Charlie talks to Ahmad about the foreign policy of the U.S. administration under 
President George W. Bush: 
“War is cruel, but not the men who wage it necessarily… That was 
Georgie. He learned to take what came, to fight guerrilla-style: hit and 
hide, hit and hide. He retreated but he never gave up. He was the Ho Chi 
Minh of his day. We were like Hamas. We were Al Qaida… He showed 
the world what can be done against the odds, against a superpower. He 
showed—and this is where Vietnam and Iraq come in—that in a war 
between an imperialist occupier and the people who actually live there, the 
people will eventually prevail.”289 
 
Similar to what Updike does with the inversion of Charlie’s and Mr. Chehab’s 
perspective, Charlie flips the narrative of the terrorist versus the 
terrorized/counterterrorist. He likens the United States to Hamas and Al Qaeda in the 
sense that it has invaded, disrupted and destroyed communities it had no business being 
in, referencing U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Iraq, both of which are considered to be 
two of America’s biggest foreign policy failures. Perhaps the most profound part of this 
excerpt is the first line: “war is cruel, but not the men who wage it necessarily.” Using 
Charlie, Updike shows the readers that if a U.S. President can be afforded humanity and 
understanding despite making decisions that have led to an obscene amount of violence 
                                               
288 Updike, Terrorist, 258. 
289 Updike, Terrorist, 181. 
  
Lilles 110 
and destruction, than why can’t terrorists be afforded the same humanity and 
understanding? 
 
The Reluctant Fundamentalist 
Hamid presents the other face of the intention-perception cycle: the perception of 
individuals who see the brutality and violence inflicted by Western superpowers, which 
in turn radicalizes them to join terrorist organizations. In the matter of the U.S.-Britain 
bombing campaign in Afghanistan, Changez “[avoided] the evening news, preferring not 
to watch the partisan and sports-event-like coverage given to the mismatch between the 
American bombers with their twenty-first-century weaponry and the ill-equipped and ill-
fed Afghan tribesmen below.”290 In his mind, the these conflicts are so asymmetrical on 
the side of the United States that it is inhumane and disproportionate, which is what led 
Changez to the conclusion that the only way to get these great powers to step down is 
through unconventional force. The dehumanization of one side directly results in the 
dehumanization of the other as a response, which then fuels the motivations—and colors 
the narratives—of both sides to eliminate one another. Changez explains this in more 
depth in talking about the role of America on the international stage:  
“As a society, you were unwilling to reflect upon the shared pain that 
united you with those who attacked you. You retreated into myths of your 
own difference, assumptions of your own superiority. And you acted out 
these beliefs on the stage of the world, so that the entire planet was rocked 
by the repercussions of your tantrums… Such an America had to be 
stopped in the interests not only of the rest of humanity, but also in your 
own.”291 
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Here, Changez explicitly calls out the United States (comprised of the government, the 
public, and the press/media) for subscribing to “myths” and “assumptions” that are then 
fed back into the “stage of the world.” He also brings the belief of American “difference” 
and “superiority” to attention, which is a significant contributing factor to the 
dehumanization of the opposition.  
 Like DeLillo in Mao II, Hamid also highlights the power of storytelling as a 
device to humanize what has been dehumanized. In The Reluctant Fundamentalist, there 
is a scene where Changez is explaining to the American how he was someone mumbled 
“fucking Arab” to him while he was walking down the streets of New York, to which he 
responds with “Say it to my face, coward, not as you run and hide,” even though Changez 
is not Arab.292 It is implied that the American asked what the man looked like, and 
Changez tells him that he “cannot now recall the man’s particulars,” but “surely it is the 
gist that matters… it is the thrust of one’s narrative that counts, not the accuracy of one’s 
details.”293 In other words, Changez was signaling to the American that he was focusing 
on the wrong parts of the story; he was so concerned about the physicality the man who 
insulting Changez that he disregarded the fact that he had said something that was not 
only rude and inappropriate, but also completely false.  
 Even if Hamid did not mean for this to be a parallel, the distinction between the 
“accuracy of [the] details” and the “thrust of [the] narrative” is comparable to the 
distinction between the function of academia and the function of fiction. On one hand, 
academia grounds itself in the details: the theories to explain patterns and trends in the 
world, the data to empirically display that the theory applies to the real world, and the 
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analysis to understand the implications of this theory. But while these details are 
incredibly important to understanding complex and nuanced concepts like terrorism, it 
does little in the way of language or style to actively engage and move the reader. On the 
other hand, this is what fiction does best: to make the reader feel and reflect on things 
they would not otherwise think about through an evocative story with a plot, a setting, 
and characters that operate within it. Although fiction may forego the application of 
theory and omit indicative facts or data, it still captures the gist that Hamid is talking 
about, and that is where the power lies. And this power, which harnesses people’s 
creativity, empathy, and receptiveness, is what allows us to see and accept each other for 
what makes us the same, instead of what makes us “other.”  
 
  
  
Lilles 113 
CONCLUSION 
 Even though fiction, by definition, is a distortion of reality, it can present a more 
nuanced and complex depiction of terrorism through relaying a narrative using a more 
intimate, emotional, and individual lens. This is not to diminish the incredible value and 
significance of academic theories and explanations, as they work to showcase the 
variations of characterizations and pathways of the terrorist profile. What the best novels 
do is take these multi-dimensional explanations and put them in the context of a story, 
enabling the reader not just to engage with these ideas, but to empathize with, relate to, 
and truly understand the perspective and journey of the terrorist. As Jackson puts it, 
“discourses are never completely hegemonic; there is always room for counter-
hegemonic struggle and subversive forms of knowledge.”294 The novel can be one of such 
subversive forms. As a caveat, I say “best” novels because the novels that were selected 
for my thesis were based on recommendations from academics. This means that they 
were vetted and chosen for their complexity, nuance and insight. I am certain that there 
are plenty of fiction novels that do subscribe to the one-dimensional.  
To be clear, though I am arguing that it is important to be able to be open to 
understanding the mental, psychological and emotional motivations of individuals who 
become terrorists, I am not arguing that the violent acts they commit are morally 
permissible. Like all human beings who inflict harm on others for their self-interest, 
terrorists should be subject to the consequences of their horrible actions, but casting them 
in an animalistic, barbaric, subhuman light is not going to help with that process. 
Nevertheless, it is important to rehumanize terrorists because terrorism functions on 
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people, not organizational structures or territory or weapons. It is the individuals that 
create the bombs and harness the fear, and if we cannot understand what motivates the 
way they think and operate, then we do not have chance at trying to prevent or protect 
against terrorism.  
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